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I. INTRODUCTION 
A number of years ago, the board of directors of one of our 
closely held, Minnesota-based corporate clients made the difficult 
decision to terminate the chief executive officer of the company.  
The CEO had founded this Internet technology company (let’s call 
it “YouBetcha.com”) and still owned a substantial percentage of the 
outstanding stock.  YouBetcha.com had done numerous rounds of 
 
 †  B.A., 1975, J.D., 1979, University of Minnesota.  The author is a partner in 
the Corporate Group of Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, and 
serves as the Director of Professional Development for that firm.  The author is a 
member of the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Business Law Section of the 
American Bar Association.  The Committee on Corporate Laws created and 
maintains the Model Business Corporation Act.  The views and opinions expressed 
in this article are those of the author and not those of Dorsey & Whitney or the 
ABA Committee on Corporate Laws.  The author is indebted to William B. Payne 
and Jay L. Swanson, partners of Dorsey & Whitney, for their helpful comments on 
this article and to Michael J. Kroll and James K. Moeller, associates of that firm, for 
their research assistance. 
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venture capital financing and was now controlled by the venture 
capitalists.  Under the direction of the CEO, however, the company 
had drifted sideways for years.  It was not realizing its early promise 
and seemed to be making no progress toward an initial public 
offering or being bought out on terms attractive to the venture 
capitalists.  The company now faced a financial precipice.  So, the 
decision was finally made: the CEO has got to go. 
Only a few days after the termination, one of my partners 
received a letter from a well-known member of the Minnesota 
corporate plaintiffs bar.  He had been retained by the former CEO.  
They were now claiming that the CEO’s termination had been 
“unfairly prejudicial” under section 302A.751 of the Minnesota 
Business Corporation Act1 and that the CEO’s shares must be 
bought out by the corporation at an exorbitant price or a claim 
would be filed immediately and a Minnesota court would surely 
grant the CEO the requested buyout under section 302A.751. 
Section 302A.751 of the Minnesota Business Corporation Act is 
the darling of the Minnesota corporate plaintiffs bar.2  The section 
has the ominous title: “Judicial intervention; equitable remedies or 
dissolution.”  This metastasized judicial dissolution statute gives 
Minnesota courts explicit authority not only to dissolve Minnesota 
corporations, but also to “grant any equitable relief they deem just 
and reasonable in the circumstances” if a shareholder succeeds in 
proving that “the directors or those in control . . . have acted in a 
manner unfairly prejudicial” toward the shareholder in his or her 
capacity as shareholder or director or, in the case of a closely held 
 
 1. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 (2000). 
 2. Corporate plaintiffs bar members and their academic supporters 
rhapsodize in their descriptions of the provision, portraying it as a miracle cure for 
combating the pathologies of close corporate greed or as the slingshot in the 
hands of little David as he squares off against management Goliaths.  E.g., Joseph 
Edward Olson, A Statutory Elixir for the Oppression Malady, 36 MERCER L. REV. 627 
(1985) [hereinafter Olson, Elixir]; Joseph W. Anthony & Karlyn Vegoe Boraas, 
Betrayed, Belittled . . . But Triumphant: Claims of Shareholders in Closely Held 
Corporations, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1173 (1996) [hereinafter Anthony & Borass, 
Betrayed].  For a brief description of the 1983 legislative amendments that gave 
section 302A.751 most of the troublesome qualities it has today by the principal 
author of the amendments, see Joseph Edward Olson, Statutory Changes Improve 
Position of Minority Shareholders in Closely-Held Corporations, THE HENNEPIN LAWYER 
(September-October 1983), at 10-11 [hereinafter Olson, Minority].  See also William 
Z. Pentelovitch & Cynthia F. Gilbertson, Upholding Shareholders’ Interests: 20 Years 
with the Minnesota Business Corporation Act, MINNESOTA BENCH & BAR, Oct. 2001, at 
19; Deborah A. Schmedemann, Fired Employees and/or Frozen-Out Shareholders (An 
Essay), 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1435, 1449 (1996). 
2
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Minnesota corporation, as officer or employee.3  In deciding 
whether to order relief, the statute requires a court to consider the 
“reasonable expectations” of shareholders.4  For purposes of 
section 302A.751, a shareholder’s reasonable expectations are not 
necessarily bound by the terms of buy-sell or employment 
agreements to which the shareholder is a party5 and are not 
necessarily affected by a shareholder’s misconduct, even egregious 
misconduct.6  In other words, section 302A.751 provides potential 
statutory justification for a court to order a buyout on terms more 
favorable than provided for in an existing buy-sell agreement to a 
shareholder-employee who has been terminated for incompetence 
 
 3. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(1)(b)(3) (2000).  The right to seek equitable 
relief under the “unfairly prejudicial” standard of section 302A.751(1)(b)(3) 
applies only to shareholders of a Minnesota corporation that is not “publicly held” 
(defined in section 302A.011(40) as having a class of equity securities registered 
pursuant to section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or being subject to 
section 15(d) of such Act).  To be actionable under section 302A.751(1)(b)(3), 
the behavior must be “unfairly prejudicial” to the shareholder in his or her 
capacity as shareholder or director unless the Minnesota corporation is also a 
“closely held corporation” (defined in section 302A.011(6)(a) as a corporation 
which does not have more than thirty-five shareholders), in which case the 
behavior may be “unfairly prejudicial” to the shareholder in his or her capacity as 
officer or employee as well as shareholder or director.  MINN. STAT. 
§302A.751(1)(b)(3) (2000).  For further discussion of section 302A.751, see infra 
notes 145 - 223 and accompanying text. 
 4. MINN. STAT. §302A.751(3)(a) (2000) (“In determining whether to order 
equitable relief, dissolution, or a buy-out, the court shall take into 
consideration . . . the reasonable expectations of all shareholders as they exist at 
the inception and develop during the course of the shareholders’ relationship 
with the corporation and each other.”)  For further discussion of the “reasonable 
expectations” standard in section 302A.751, see infra notes 164 - 180 and 
accompanying text. 
 5. The statute provides a presumption that written employment or buy-sell 
agreements embody the shareholders’ reasonable expectations.  MINN. STAT. § 
302A.751(3a) (2000).  But courts may override that presumption, see infra notes 
186 - 212 and accompanying text, and the statute invites a court to do so if it finds 
that “price or terms are unreasonable under all the circumstances of the case.”  
MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(2). 
 6. See, e.g., Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1994) (finding that a shareholder, director and officer who was removed as 
director and officer following multiple criminal convictions for assault and 
damage to property in the course of employment was entitled to section 302A.751 
buy-out of shares at fair value without equitable reduction for misconduct).  
Admitting that the plaintiff’s behavior in Pooley was “fairly egregious,” proponents 
of section 302A.751 view the case as “a good example of the strong protections 
that minority shareholders have been given.”  Anthony & Borass, Betrayed, supra 
note 2, at 1181.  For further discussion, see infra notes 178 - 181 and 
accompanying text. 
3
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or even criminal misconduct in complete conformity with all other 
law as well as any existing employment agreement. 
Section 302A.751 is, in my view, one of the most potentially 
disruptive provisions in all of U.S. corporate statutory law.  It stands 
as a monument to unpredictability and uncertainty. 
My partner showed me the section 302A.751 demand letter.  
He let me read it as he stood in front of my desk with a little hint of 
a smile on his face. 
“Ugh.  What a mess!”  I commiserated.  “Just what a struggling 
company needs: long, drawn-out litigation over an expensive 
buyout of shares from the guy that ran the company into the 
ground.” 
My partner’s little smile broadened until his face was beaming.  
He brought another piece of paper from behind his back and 
handed it to me to read. 
“Nope.  I’ve already taken care of the whole thing with one 
letter.” 
I looked at the letter he handed me.  It was addressed to the 
well known corporate plaintiffs attorney.  It had only one sentence: 
“Responding to your recent letter, please be advised that 
YouBetcha.com is a Delaware corporation.” 
My partner took the rest of the day off.  He had done a 
tremendous day’s work for the shareholders and other 
constituencies of our client.  The real lawyering, however, had not 
been done that day by writing the silver-bullet letter.  It had been 
done years before when he advised that YouBetcha.com should 
incorporate in Delaware and not in Minnesota, in part to avoid the 
unpredictability of section 302A.751. 
Minnesota has become a poor choice for incorporation in 
nearly all cases beyond that of a one-person, one-shareholder 
incorporated proprietorship.  That is a shame.  Citizens of this state 
have the right to expect that our state’s corporate laws embody a 
flexible and balanced set of rules under which entrepreneurs and 
investors can come together to establish and then realize their 
reasonable expectations with the greatest possible predictability 
and certainty.  Making a business succeed is tough enough without 
our corporate laws adding unnecessarily to the unpredictability and 
uncertainty. 
One reason lawyers frequently cite for incorporating a business 
in Delaware instead of their own state is that Delaware courts have 
produced extensive case law precedent interpreting Delaware’s 
4
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corporation statute, the Delaware General Corporation Law (the 
“DGCL”), and fleshing out the primarily non-statutory areas of 
corporate governance law.7  Better definition may mean greater 
predictability and certainty in the law.  Minnesota certainly lacks a 
comprehensive body of corporate case precedent, and that may be 
a very important reason for preferring Delaware.8  But all states 
other than Delaware have this same problem to a greater or lesser 
extent. 
 
 7. “Corporate lawyers across the United States have praised the expertise of 
the Court of Chancery, noting that since the turn of the century, it has handed 
down thousands of opinions interpreting virtually every provision of Delaware’s 
corporate law statute.  No other state can make such a claim.”  E. Norman Veasey, 
An Economic Rationale for Judicial Decisionmaking in Corporate Law, 53 BUS. LAW. 681, 
682 (1998) (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist in William H. Rehnquist, The 
Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of 
Providing Justice, 48 BUS. LAW. 351, 354 (1992)). 
 8. The absence of case law precedent under the Minnesota statute is 
remarkable.  According to a Westlaw search conducted on October 24, 2001 
(“302A” and “corporation” in the MN-CS-ALL database), there were only 205 
Minnesota Supreme Court, Minnesota Court of Appeals or federal court cases 
citing chapter 302A in the twenty years since its adoption in 1981.  Upon 
examination, only 118 of these could be said to address substantive issues under 
the MBCA, as opposed to simply citing the statute incidentally.  Of those 118 
substantive cases, a total of 46 addressed primarily issues under section 302A.751 
(with 18 other cases dealing with Section 302A.751 but also addressing other 
issues).  That leaves only 72 cases decided by state or federal courts that have really 
interpreted parts of the Minnesota statute (other than section 302A.751) or 
otherwise addressed substantive, non-statutory aspects of Minnesota corporate law.  
Although these 72 cases provide authority on a number of significant points that 
should be relevant in choosing a corporate home, what they do not provide is even 
more telling.  Case law explaining the duty of care in Minnesota is scarce.  
Although a number of cases refer to the existence of the business judgment rule in 
Minnesota, there is little in the way of clear articulation of the rule.  There are no 
cases interpreting the practical scope of protection afforded by a Minnesota 
charter option provision exculpating directors from liability for monetary damages 
to the corporation and its shareholders.  No cases have interpreted the meaning of 
the “other constituencies” provision in section 302A.251.  There is little authority 
interpreting Minnesota’s indemnification provisions.  It is unclear whether 
Minnesota courts have adopted the Unocal, Revlon or Blasius standards articulated 
by the Delaware courts.  In fact, there is no clear Minnesota authority for the 
proposition that Minnesota courts, when lacking their own authority, will 
consistently follow Delaware’s lead.  Case law interpreting important elements of 
the merger and asset sale provisions relevant to M&A practice is almost 
nonexistent.  There is almost no case authority interpreting the arcane 
complexities of the various Minnesota anti-takeover statutes.  Memorandum from 
James K. Moeller, to Bryn R. Vaaler (Jan. 4, 2002) (on file with author); 
Memorandum from Michael J. Kroll, to Bryn R. Vaaler (Nov. 11, 2001) (on file 
with author). 
5
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The problems that really set Minnesota apart relate to the 
Minnesota Business Corporation Act, chapter 302A of the 
Minnesota Statutes (the “MBCA” or “chapter 302A”).  The MBCA 
was adopted in 1981 and went into effect for all Minnesota business 
corporations on January 1, 1984.9  Although based in large part on 
the Model Business Corporation Act (the “Model Act”)10 as it 
existed circa 1979, chapter 302A contained, from the start, an 
eclectic mix of other disparate currents in corporate statutory law 
as well as a number of home-grown novelties.11  In the two decades 
 
 9. MINN. STAT. § 302A.001 (2000); JOHN H. MATHESON & PHILIP S. GARON, 
MINNESOTA CORPORATION LAW & PRACTICE § 1.1, at 1-3 (1992). 
 10. The Model Act was developed by the Committee on Corporate Laws of 
the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association and first published in 
1950.  The ongoing amendment and refinement of the Model Act is the 
continuing job of the Committee on Corporate Laws.  After nearly thirty years of 
amendments, the Committee on Corporate Laws undertook a complete revision 
and restatement of the Model Act.  This task was completed in 1984 with the 
publication of what became known as the Revised Model Business Corporation 
Act.  As the Revised Model Business Corporation Act became widely known and 
adopted over the next six years, the Revised Model Business Corporation Act was 
re-named simply the Model Business Corporation Act.  Today, the Model Act is 
the most influential source of corporate statutory law in the United States.  
Approximately half of the states have adopted the Model Act more or less verbatim 
as their corporation statute.  As the Committee on Corporate Laws considers and 
adopts further amendments and refinements, such changes are published in The 
Business Lawyer in proposed and final form and are considered and acted upon by 
legislatures throughout the country.  See generally 1 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. 
xxvii-xxxix (3d ed. 2000); Richard A. Booth, A Chronology of the Evolution of the 
MBCA, 56 BUS. LAW. 63 (2000).  For a recent comparison of the Model Act and the 
Delaware General Corporation Law, see Michael P. Dooley & Michael D. 
Goldman, Some Comparisons between the Model Business Corporation Act and the 
Delaware General Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 737 (2001).  The Model Act is 
published in its entirety along with the extensive Official Commentary and 
annotations of case precedent drawn from states that have adopted the Model Act 
in The Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, which is currently in its third 
edition. 
 11. Advisory Task Force on Corporation Law Report to the Senate and 
Preface to Reporter’s Notes reprinted in Reporter’s Notes to Section 302A.001, 
WEST’S MINNESOTA CORPORATION, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, AND PARTNERSHIP 
LAWS 62 (2001-2002 Special Pamphlet). 
[P]ortions of the proposed new Minnesota Business Corporation Act 
were derived from provisions [of the previous Minnesota act].  Most of 
these provisions were rewritten in whole or in part for clarity and 
consistency with other provisions in the proposed act.  Other portions of 
the proposed new business corporation act were similarly derived from 
the Model Business Corporation Act and the business corporation laws of 
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, 
New Jersey, and New York.  However, other provisions in the proposed 
new act have no counterpart elsewhere and represent innovations in 
6
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since its adoption, more novelties have been added and little 
attention has been paid to important changes and new directions 
in U.S. corporate statutory law as embodied in ongoing 
amendments to the Model Act.  As a result, the idiosyncrasies of the 
MBCA have become more and more exaggerated. 
Today, I believe that the best advice Minnesota lawyers can 
give their clients, whether their businesses are to be closely or 
publicly held, is to avoid incorporating in Minnesota.12 
Minnesota deserves better than this.  The MBCA should be 
scrapped in its entirety.  Years of inattention, fuzzy thinking, sloppy 
drafting and bad choices have resulted in a statute that is really 
beyond patchwork repair even by an informed and interested 
legislature acting under the advice and close direction of an expert 
and active corporate bar.  Instead, Minnesota should do what 
nearly half the states in the United States have done: adopt the 
Model Act as it exists today in its entirety and commit to a 
disciplined program of prompt consideration of, and action on, 
future amendments and improvements to the Model Act with a 
view toward keeping Minnesota in the mainstream of corporate 
statutory law. 
II. WHY THE MBCA SHOULD BE SCRAPPED 
What makes the MBCA such a bad corporation statute?  Here 
are some of the reasons in no special order: 
 
business corporation law. 
Id. at 68-69.  See also MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 1.1, at 1-3. 
 12. As noted, the only exception to this rule would be an incorporated sole 
proprietorship in which there will never be more than one shareholder.  If that is 
the case, none of the problems with the MBCA (or for that matter any other state 
corporate statute) really make much difference.  The reason most often given for 
incorporating a closely held business locally instead of in Delaware is cost: the cost 
of maintaining a registered agent and office for service of process in Delaware, the 
cost of foreign qualification in the home state of the business and the cost of 
Delaware franchise and filing taxes.  E.g., ROBERT W. HAMILTON, BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS: UNINCORPORATED BUSINESSES AND CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS § 
8.17, at 213 (1996); WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 143 (7th ed. 2000); 
ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW § 
1.08[A], at 13 (1999).  With proper planning such as limiting the number of 
authorized shares to avoid high franchise taxes, these additional costs can easily be 
kept under $1,000 annually for most closely held corporations. 
7
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A.  Wrong-headed Defaults 
A corporation statute consists of two kinds of provisions: 
absolute rules and default rules.13  Absolute rules are invariable.  
For example, the MBCA provides that owners of ten percent or 
more of the outstanding shares of a corporation have the right to 
call a special meeting of shareholders with or without the consent 
of the board.14  This right may not be varied by providing to the 
contrary in the articles of incorporation, the bylaws or otherwise. 
Default rules may be varied by making provision in the articles 
or certificate of incorporation, in the bylaws, by board resolution or 
by contract, all as specified in the relevant corporation statute.  For 
example, the MBCA provides that shareholders take action by the 
affirmative vote of a majority of the votes at a meeting at which a 
quorum is present, unless the articles of incorporation provide for 
a greater vote requirement.15  Minnesota corporations may 
therefore have super-majority voting by provision in their articles of 
incorporation. 
Big-ticket default rules may generally be varied only by 
provision in the articles or certificate of incorporation.  This makes 
important default elections a matter of public record (since the 
articles or certificate of incorporation, unlike bylaws, resolutions or 
contracts, must be on file in the office of the Secretary of State or 
other government official charged with oversight of corporations in 
a particular state).  It also makes such elections subject to change 
only with both board and shareholder approval.16 
Two of the biggest-ticket default rules in the MBCA—the rules 
on cumulative voting for directors and preemptive rights—are set 
the wrong way.  They provide by default for a rule that no 
knowledgeable corporate lawyer would ever advise for his or her 
 
 13. JAMES D. COX, THOMAS LEE HAZEN & F. HODGE O’NEAL, CORPORATIONS § 
3.10, at 3.29 to 3.30 (2001). 
Under most corporate statutes, certain rules as to corporate organization, 
meetings, and management are mandatory and cannot be varied by the 
articles, while other rules apply only in the absence of some variation, 
which must be stated in the articles (in some cases, the variation may be 
in either the articles or the bylaws). 
Id. (parenthetical included in original, footnotes omitted). 
 14. MINN. STAT. § 302A.433(1)(e) (2000). 
 15. MINN. STAT. § 302A.437(1) (2000). 
 16. For a description of the corporate charter as a sort of public contract 
between and among the shareholders, the corporation and the state, see COX, 
HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 3.11, at 3.30 to 3.32. 
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss4/4
02_VAALER 5/23/2002  5:00 PM 
2002] SCRAP THE MINNESOTA CORPORATION ACT 1373 
client.  For the uninitiated, this makes the MBCA a trap for the 
unwary.  For those who know better, this makes it necessary to 
provide opt-out language in every single set of Minnesota articles 
prepared.  Every single one.  Why would a corporation statute 
provide a default rule that no knowledgeable practitioner would 
ever leave as is? 
Cumulative voting.  The MBCA provides that shareholders of a 
Minnesota corporation may vote cumulatively for election of 
directors unless an opt-out provision is contained in the articles of 
incorporation.17 
Under normal voting for directors, the holders of a majority of 
the shares of voting stock of the corporation can elect the entire 
board of directors.18  Cumulative voting is an alternative method of 
voting for directors designed to give minority shareholders some 
representation on the board.19  How many shares it takes to ensure 
the ability, through cumulative voting, to elect one board member 
turns on a complex formula dependent on the number of shares 
present and voting, the number of board seats open for election 
and other factors.20  Every time the number of outstanding shares 
or the number of directors on the board changes, the minimum 
number of shares required to elect one director also changes.  In 
order for minority shareholders to use cumulative voting to their 
benefit, they must give timely notice of intent to vote cumulatively 
 
 17. MINN. STAT. § 302A.215(1) (2000).  The default in favor of cumulative 
voting was retained from the predecessor statute to the MBCA.  Id. (Reporter’s 
Notes - 1981, General Comment). 
 18. COX, HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 13.21, at 13.45 (“Without 
cumulative voting, holders of a bare majority of the shares may elect the full board 
and thus control the corporation without any representatives of other interests 
being present at board meetings.”). 
 19. “Cumulative voting is the privilege of multiplying the number of shares 
held by the number of directors to be elected and casting the product for a single 
candidate or distributing the product among two or more candidates.”  Id. 
 20. Id. 
The following algebraic formula is sometimes used to determine how 
many votes of those present is sufficient under cumulative voting to elect 
a specified number of directors: 
x = a  x  b + 1 
c  +  1 
with a representing the number of directors [a shareholder] desires to 
elect, b the number of shares present and voting, c the total number of 
vacancies to be filled, and x the number of shares necessary to achieve 
the desired objective. 
Id. at 13.46 n.4. 
9
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and must cumulate their votes in exactly the right manner, 
otherwise it does not work.21 
For these reasons, no knowledgeable corporate lawyer ever 
intentionally advises a client to build cumulative voting into the 
corporation.  If the shareholders have agreed to minority 
representation on the board, that result can be achieved with much 
greater precision and certainty through use of multiple classes of 
stock or voting agreements.  If the shareholders have not agreed to 
minority representation on the board, most people doing business 
in corporate form would probably expect that the majority 
shareholders can elect the entire board22 and would be, to put it 
mildly, unpleasantly surprised to be bushwhacked by a minority 
shareholder exercising statutory rights to cumulative voting.23 
The MBCA got it wrong by making cumulative voting an opt-
out measure.  The Delaware General Corporation Law and the 
corporation statutes of most other jurisdictions make cumulative 
voting an opt-in provision.24  So does the Model Act.25  The 
reasoning offered for the Minnesota opt-out approach is stated in 
the Reporter’s Notes to section 302A.215: “shareholders of a close 
corporation would probably bargain for the inclusion of such a 
provision in the articles.”26  What exactly does this mean?  Does it 
mean that shareholders of a Minnesota corporation would 
probably have an unspoken expectation that there would be in 
place an uncertain and unwieldy rule that would permit minority 
shareholders at some constantly changing percentage level some 
representation on the board?  To me, that seems pretty unlikely 
 
 21. This is why most corporate statutes require advance notice (e.g., twenty-
four or forty-eight hours) by any shareholder who intends to use cumulative 
voting.  Id. at 13.47.  The Model Act, for example, requires forty-eight hours of 
advance notice if cumulative voting is permitted.  MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.28(d) 
(2000).  The MBCA has eliminated an advance notice requirement.  See MINN. 
STAT. § 302A.215 (2000) (Reporter’s Notes). 
 22. At least that has been the conclusion in most states, since cumulative 
voting is an opt-in provision (i.e., no cumulative voting unless provided to the 
contrary in the articles) in most jurisdictions.  COX, HAZEN & O’NEIL, supra note 
13, § 13.21, at 13.48. 
 23. Bushwhacked is the operative term in Minnesota.  The twenty-four hour 
advance notice requirement under the previous statute was eliminated in section 
302A.215.  MINN. STAT. § 302A.215 (2000) (Reporter’s Notes).  All that is required 
now is written notice to any officer before the meeting.  Id. 
 24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (2000).  With respect to other jurisdictions, 
see COX, HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 13.21, at 13.48. 
 25. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.28(b) (2000). 
 26. MINN. STAT. § 302A.215 (Reporter’s Notes). 
10
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(and pretty bad legal policy).  I think the far more likely 
expectation (and far better legal policy) would be that minority 
shareholders with a real expectation of ability to elect one or more 
directors would want some certainty and predictability.  That’s how 
the drafters of the Model Act and the legislatures in most states see 
it. 
You may be saying: “Big deal.  All you have to do is negate 
cumulative voting in your articles.”  That is basically true.27  But the 
problem is that even good lawyers forget.  When they realize their 
mistake (for example, at the point when due diligence is being 
done in connection with a financing transaction), they invariably 
want to eliminate the problem as soon as possible.  The MBCA 
makes this very difficult.  A minority shareholder with enough 
shares to ensure election of one director under cumulative voting 
can veto an amendment of the articles for the purpose of negating 
 
 27. Actually, in Minnesota, this is not quite true.  The MBCA does not 
explicitly state what the voting rule for election of directors is if cumulative voting 
is eliminated.  Compare MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.28(a) (2000) (explicitly stating 
that directors are elected by plurality vote unless otherwise provided in the articles 
of incorporation) with MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.215 & 302A.437 (2000) (indicating 
that election of directors would be subject to the basic majority-of-a-quorum voting 
rule).  This means that, in a Minnesota corporation opting out of cumulative 
voting, directors must probably receive a majority vote to be duly elected and, 
consequently, that all director seats open for election may not be filled.  
MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 3.9, at 3-18 to 3-19.  It is unlikely that an 
articles or bylaw provision providing for plurality voting would be effective under 
the MBCA, since section 302A.437(1) makes provision only for increasing 
shareholder voting requirements, not decreasing them, in the articles.  MINN. 
STAT. § 302A.437(1) (2000).  This is a perfect example of shoddy drafting in the 
MBCA and a good illustration of why the whole statute should be scrapped.  A 
Minnesota corporation simply cannot achieve the full flexibility available under a 
Model Act statute by negating cumulative voting! 
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cumulative voting.28  An amendment of Minnesota articles to 
eliminate cumulative voting also triggers appraisal rights.29 
Preemptive rights.  The MBCA also makes preemptive rights 
an opt-out default.  Section 302A.413 of the MBCA provides that 
shareholders of a Minnesota corporation have preemptive rights 
unless provided to the contrary in the articles of incorporation.30  
Statutory preemptive rights give each shareholder the right to 
acquire a fraction of all new securities or rights to purchase 
securities of the same type owned by the shareholder before the 
corporation may offer such securities or rights to others.31  The 
fraction is equal to the shareholder’s pro-rata ownership of the 
securities of the relevant type before the proposed issuance.32  
There are important exemptions to Minnesota’s version of 
statutory preemptive rights.  For example, preemptive rights do not 
apply to securities issued for consideration other than money or 
issued in a merger transaction or issued in a public offering.33 
 
 28. Section 302A.215(2) provides for this supermajority vote with respect to 
any amendment to the “articles or bylaws which has the effect of denying, limiting 
or modifying the right to cumulative voting for directors.”  MINN. STAT. § 
302A.215(2) (2000).  Since cumulative voting can only be effectively negated in 
the articles, it is clear from the reference to “bylaws” and from the “limiting or 
modifying” language that the supermajority voting requirement is intended to 
apply to adoption of other measures that could be viewed as lessening a 
shareholder’s director election potential through cumulative voting.  For example, 
an articles amendment to classify the board or reduce board size would arguably 
be subject to the supermajority vote in section 302A.215(2) if the Minnesota 
corporation has cumulative voting.  For an extensive discussion of the broad but 
ambiguous reach of section 302A.215, see MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 3.8, 
at 3-14 to 3-18. 
 29. Section 302A.471(1)(a)(4) triggers dissenter’s rights if an articles 
amendment “excludes or limits” a shareholder’s right to cumulative voting.  The 
reach of this provision is as vague as the reach of the supermajority voting 
requirement in section 302A.215(2).  MINN. STAT. § 302A.471(1)(a)(4) (2000).  
See MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 3.8, at 3-17.  See also supra  note 28.  In 
Whetstone v. Hossfeld Mfg. Co., the Minnesota Supreme Court confirmed that under 
section 302A.471(1)(a)(4), dissenter’s rights are triggered in a closely held 
Minnesota corporation with cumulative voting by an amendment to the articles 
decreasing the maximum board size from five to three.  457 N.W.2d 380, 385 
(Minn. 1990). 
 30. MINN. STAT. § 302A.413(1) (2000).  See generally MATHESON & GARON, 
supra note 9, §§ 5.9-5.11, at 5-32 to 5-37. 
 31. MINN. STAT. § 302A.413(2) (2000).  See MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, 
§ 5.9, at 5-32. 
 32. MINN. STAT. § 302A.413(5) (2000).  See MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, 
§ 5.9, at 5-34. 
 33. MINN. STAT. § 302A.413(4) (2000).  See MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, 
§ 5.11, at 5-35 to 5-37. 
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Once again, no knowledgeable lawyer would ever advise in 
favor of statutory preemptive rights.  If minority shareholders truly 
have an expectation and agreement that they will be afforded the 
opportunity to maintain their percentage ownership through a 
right of refusal to acquire securities in subsequent issuances, that 
expectation and agreement may be embodied with much greater 
certainty and precision in an agreement with the corporation.34  
From the corporation’s standpoint, statutory preemptive rights may 
interfere greatly with the ability to finance the corporate business. 
For these reasons, the DGCL, the Model Act and the corporate 
statutes in a majority of U.S. jurisdictions make preemptive rights 
an opt-in provision.35  No preemptive rights exist unless explicitly so 
provided in the certificate or articles of incorporation. 
Once again, the MBCA provides a treacherous trap for the 
unwary.  I have seen even good Minnesota lawyers forget to negate 
preemptive rights in the articles of incorporation.  The results can 
be absolutely devastating.  The corporation may have existed and 
financed itself without complying with the preemptive rights 
requirements for years before the existence of the rights are 
discovered.  More than once in the course of performing a due 
diligence review of a Minnesota corporation on behalf of an 
investor group, we have discovered that preemptive rights exist and 
have not been complied with.  The corporation must then go to its 
shareholders and beg them to waive their rights with respect to past 
issuances and agree to amend the articles of incorporation to opt 
out of statutory preemptive rights for the future.  Any shareholder 
so inclined can use this occasion to blackmail everyone else 
involved by insisting on their pound of flesh with respect to prior 
issuances.  Removing preemptive rights for the future requires an 
amendment to the articles of incorporation.36  Such an amendment 
triggers appraisal rights.37 
 
 34. Such agreements are explicitly authorized by section 302A.413(10) of the 
MBCA, which provides that denial of statutory preemptive rights in the articles of 
incorporation in no way limits the power of the corporation to grant any type of 
contractual rights of first refusal.  MINN. STAT. § 302A.413(10) (2000).  
Contractual rights of first refusal can also protect shareholders in ways that 
statutory preemptive rights, with all their exemptions, cannot.  COX, HAZEN & 
O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 16.22, at 16.62. 
 35. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(3) (2000); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 
6.30(b) (2000).  With respect to the majority of U.S. jurisdictions being opt-in, see 
COX, HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 16.22, at 16.56; PINTO & BRANSON, supra 
note 12, § 4.04[A], at 73. 
 36. If the corporation has cumulative voting, a minority shareholder with 
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B.  Misguided Policy Underpinnings 
The wrong-headedness behind the Minnesota approach to 
cumulative voting and to preemptive rights is the result, I believe, 
of some fundamental philosophical or policy positions taken by 
those who have been responsible for the MBCA.  These positions 
explain many of the worst problems in the statute. 
Protecting “widows and orphans” as a first priority.  First, the 
MBCA is overly protective of minority shareholders.  In a well-
meaning, but misguided, example of prairie populist thinking, 
those responsible for the MBCA have somehow equated minority 
shareholders to political, racial or religious minorities or other 
segments of the population needing special protection.  One of the 
most active contributors to the minority protection provisions of 
the MBCA, in an article on the 1983 amendments to the MBCA 
aimed at stiffening minority protections, maintained that “the 
classic victims” of shareholder abuse are “widows and orphans.”38  
The equation is questionable at best.  Minority shareholders 
generally do not become such by accident of birth or death but by 
 
enough shares to ensure election of one director can veto an amendment of the 
articles “which has the effect of denying, limiting, or modifying” preemptive rights.  
MINN. STAT. § 302A.413(9) (2000).  As originally added in the 1983 amendments 
to the MBCA, this supermajority voting requirement applied even if the 
corporation did not have cumulative voting.  See MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, 
§ 5.9, at 5-33.  This bizarre aberration was corrected in 1993 amendments to the 
MBCA.  However, even in a corporation that has cumulative voting, it is hard to 
see a logical reason why elimination of preemptive rights should turn on a 
cumulative-voting-based supermajority.  The principal author of the 1983 
amendments offers no explanation of the logic beyond need to protect minority 
shareholders.  See Olson, Minority, supra note 2, at 25.  Because the supermajority 
requirement applies to any articles amendment having the “effect of denying, 
limiting or modifying” preemptive rights, it has the same problems of vagueness of 
reach as the supermajority requirement for elimination of cumulative voting 
discussed supra in notes 28 and 29.  See MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 5.9, at 
5-33 n.119. 
 37. Section 302A.471(1)(a)(3) triggers dissenter’s rights if an articles 
amendment “alters or abolishes” a shareholder’s preemptive rights.  The reach of 
this provision is as vague as the reach of the supermajority voting requirements in 
sections 302A.215(2) and 302A.413(9) and the analogous dissenter’s rights trigger 
for “excluding or limiting” cumulative voting.  MINN. STAT. § 302A.471(1)(a)(3) 
(2000).  See supra notes 28, 29 & 36. 
 38. Olson, Elixir, supra note 2, at 629; Olson, Minority, supra note 2, at 10.  
Although I have not done a close review of the dozens of cases decided under 
section 302A.751 of the MBCA, I would bet that most of them do not involve 
widows or orphans as plaintiffs.  In fact, I would speculate that widows and 
orphans are involved no more often than incompetent or unfaithful employees 
and managers, quarrelsome siblings and convicted wrongdoers. 
14
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volitional act and agreement.  Although any corporation statute 
must balance the good of the majority with the good of the 
minority,39 the balance struck in the MBCA is substantially out of 
line with the current mainstream of corporate statutory law. 
Clarity, predictability and certainty as lesser priorities.  The 
MBCA seems consistently to undervalue clarity, predictability and 
certainty.  The nexus of contracts that comprises the law of 
corporations is more complex than a purely contractual 
relationship.  Of necessity, it must include somewhat vague, extra-
contractual duties and rights (like the fiduciary obligations and 
duty of fairness protecting minority shareholders from those 
wielding power).  However, the more our corporate law builds 
vagueness, unpredictability and uncertainty into the nexus of 
contracts and the more it vests the power to unleash that 
vagueness, unpredictability and uncertainty in those who may have 
a disproportionately small investment in the enterprise, the less 
well it serves the enterprise and its economic goals.40 
 
 39. “The history of the corporation evidences a tension between the impulse 
to let people contract freely, and a concern for those harmed by such contracts.”  
David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability Company: How 
Should Courts and Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary 
Responsibility and Securities Regulation for the Limited Liability Company?, 51 OKLA. L. 
REV. 427, 433 (1998). 
 40. See infra notes 165 to 180 and accompanying text.  In assessing the DGCL, 
three practitioner-commentators have noted: 
The Delaware bar and legislature have fashioned a statute that, for the 
most part, fulfills the criteria for a good corporation statute: (i) 
Technical flaws are eliminated quickly.  (ii)  Corporate transactions are 
made easier to accomplish, successfully bypassing the idea that difficulty 
is more moral.  (iii) A large role is left to private contract through charter 
amendment.  (iv) There are few obstacles to majority rule. 
Leo Herzel et al., Contents to Trouble, 42 BUS. LAW. 135, 135 (1986).  The major 
proponents of the minority shareholder “protections” in the MBCA obviously do 
not agree with these criteria for a good statute.  They have promoted minority 
shareholder rights by intentionally inserting confusion and litigation-generating 
ambiguity into the statute, all the while arguing that their intention is to simplify, 
clarify and reduce wasteful litigation.  For example, the principal author of the 
1983 amendments to section 302A.751 apparently promoted those changes to the 
legislature as a means of removing uncertainty and reducing litigation.  Professor 
Olson notes that “section 751 is designed to reduce litigation by removing 
questions of law as obstacles to relief for noncontrolling shareholders.  The law is 
now clear – minority shareholders have a right to relief from ‘mistreatment’ that 
exploits their vulnerability and defeats their reasonable expectations.”  Olson, 
Elixir, supra note 2, at 633.  In a footnote to this statement, Professor Olson defines 
what he means by “mistreatment:”  it is “a general term that encompasses all acts 
of the controlling group which leave other shareholders at a disadvantage.”  Id. at 
633 n.43.  So, section 302A.751 in its present form was apparently sold to the 
15
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Hardwiring it into the statute.  The MBCA favors hardwiring 
rules into the statute. The unmistakable direction of evolution in 
corporate law (and in business association law generally) has been 
away from the mandatory, structured, vested rights of the 
shareholder and toward a more purely enabling, contractual 
approach.41  Where a shareholder invests in an enterprise with little 
or no explicit contractual specification, our corporate laws should 
provide a nexus of contract that should have its default switches set 
on relative simplicity, certainty, predictability and ability of the 
majority to move forward with maximum flexibility.  Minority 
protections, where needed, should be as clear and crisp as possible.  
Where a shareholder invests in an enterprise with more explicit 
contractual specification (e.g., preferred stock, buy-sell 
agreement), the rules of corporate law ought generally to yield to, 
not override, the contractual specification. 
 
legislature as a litigation-reducing cure for mistreatment of minority shareholders, 
but was intended by its author to really be a no-fault right to recovery whenever a 
minority shareholder is disappointed.  The confusing language of section 
302A.751 reflects this lack of clarity in purpose, and it is not surprising that this 
litigation-reducing “elixir” has produced more litigation (judging from the 
number of reported cases) than any other provision in the MBCA.  See supra note 
8. 
 41. “This movement toward enabling statutes has accelerated within the last 
twenty-five years, as the contractarian view of corporations has gained more of a 
following.  As corporation statutes have become more enabling, there has been a 
similar effect upon other business entity statutes.”  Thomas F. Blackwell, The 
Revolution Is Here: The Promise of a Unified Business Entity Code, 24 J. CORP. L. 333, 
338 (1999).  “Critics and advocates agree that a revolution, under the banner 
‘nexus of contracts,’ has in the last decade swept the legal theory of the 
corporation.”  Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: 
A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (1989).  For 
additional support for the contractarian evolution or revolution in corporate 
statutory law, see COX, HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 25.7, at 25.29; PINTO & 
BRANSON, supra note 12, at 114; William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in 
Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1395 (1993); Robert C. Clark, 
Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1703, 1705 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contractual Freedom 
in Corporate Law: Articles & Comments; The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1416, 1416 (1989); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1549 (1989); Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity 
Theory of the Corporation, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (1994); Ralph K. Winter, 
Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 
251, 251 (1977).  The Model Act recognized the importance of this contractarian 
trend as it applies to privately held corporations in adopting section 7.32 in 1990.  
Section 7.32 recognizes the validity of agreements among all shareholders of a 
privately held corporation even though such agreements may be inconsistent with 
one or more provisions of the Model Act, so long as such agreements are not 
contrary to public policy.  MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32(a) (2000). 
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The MBCA was written with too much power and uncertainty 
vested in minority shareholders in ways that cannot be varied by 
agreement among the participants to the corporate enterprise.  
The wrong-headed defaults with respect to cumulative voting and 
preemptive rights reflect all three of these problems.  Cumulative 
voting and preemptive rights are both, supposedly, minority 
protective defaults.  They both entail such uncertainty and 
unpredictability, however, that no one knowledgeable would ever 
count on them to truly protect a minority shareholder, and no one 
concerned with the majority’s ability to function efficiently would 
ever knowingly permit them to remain the operative rules.  
Nevertheless, cumulative voting and pre-emptive rights are baked 
into the MBCA as opt-out defaults. 
C.  Onerous Class and Series Voting Requirements 
All U.S. corporation statutes have provisions giving 
outstanding shares of a class or series of stock mandatory voting 
rights with respect to certain types of amendments to the articles or 
certificate of incorporation even if the articles or certificate of 
incorporation negates the right of such shares to vote.42  Such 
provisions are intended to give holders of a class or series a veto 
power over amendments that would adversely affect their rights 
even if such a voting power is denied in the terms of their class or 
series.43 
The MBCA list of consequences requiring separate vote is 
considerably more extensive than the Delaware list (ten items 
versus three).44  Except in certain situations involving stock splits, 
the MBCA requires a separate vote if the number of authorized 
shares of the class or series would be increased or decreased.45  The 
DGCL requires a separate vote on such increases or decreases 
unless the certificate of incorporation denies it.46  Minnesota also 
requires a separate vote if the amendment would, among other 
things, effect an exchange or reclassification of the class or series, 
 
 42. COX, HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 25.5, at 25.18. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Compare MINN. STAT. § 302A.137 (2000) with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
242(b)(2) (2000).  See also COX, HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 25.5, at 25.19 
(“Delaware is distinctive in the brevity with which its statute proscribes 
amendments triggering a class vote.”). 
 45. MINN. STAT. § 302A.137(a) (2000). 
 46. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2000). 
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create a new class or series (or increase the authorized shares of an 
existing class or series) with prior or superior rights or preferences 
or change the rights or preferences of the class or series in any 
way.47  Delaware requires a separate vote only if a change would 
affect the rights or preferences of the class or series so as to affect 
them adversely.48 
The MBCA class or series voting triggers are therefore more 
numerous and substantially broader than their DGCL counterparts, 
giving shareholders of classes or series that may constitute minority 
participations in the corporation a veto power over important 
changes that may go beyond any self-defense justification.  The 
result is a significant potential for obstructionism by minority 
investors under the MBCA that may be troublesome for 
management and majority investors. 
The Model Act provides nearly as many triggers as the MBCA, 
but has eliminated entirely the trigger for increases or decreases in 
the aggregate number of authorized shares of the class or series.49  
So, if Minnesota follows the advice of this article and adopts the 
Model Act as it currently exists, there will not be a huge 
improvement in onerous class and series voting requirements.50  
However, the Model Act has been moving away from overloading 
minority protections connected with articles amendments, as 
shown by the important reduction in appraisal rights made to the 
Model Act in 1999.51 
D.  Expansive Appraisal Rights Provisions 
All modern corporation statutes grant shareholders the right 
to dissent from certain corporate actions and be paid in cash by the 
 
 47. MINN. STAT. § 302A.137(b)-(i) (2000). 
 48. DEL. CODE  ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2000). 
 49. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.04 (2000). 
 50. The Model Act does, however, lessen the potential for obstructionism by 
requiring that classes or series that are similarly affected by an amendment must 
vote together and not as separate classes or series.  Id. § 10.04(c).  For illustrations 
of how this provision operates, see id. § 10.04 (Official Comment).  The MBCA 
does not have a comparable provision. 
 51. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business 
Corporation Act Pertaining to Appraisal Rights and to Fundamental Changes – Final 
Adoption, 55 BUS. LAW. 405, 405-406 (1999) [hereinafter Committee on Corporate 
Laws, Changes in the Model Act]; Committee on Corporate Laws, Proposed Changes in 
the Model Business Corporation Act—Appraisal Rights, 54 BUS. LAW. 209 (1998) 
[hereinafter Committee on Corporate Laws, Proposed Changes in the Model Act].  See 
also infra notes 62 through 66 and accompanying text. 
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corporation the fair value of their shares.52  Dissenter’s rights of 
appraisal were devised as a statutory escape valve for minority 
investors.  The majority can have flexibility in making fundamental 
changes in the corporation and the terms of the investment 
contract, but the minority shareholder can liquidate and escape if 
they so choose.53  The Minnesota provision is substantially more 
favorable to dissenting shareholders than the Delaware provision 
for two major reasons: 
Actions triggering appraisal rights.  Delaware appraisal rights 
only arise in the case of mergers or consolidations, and there is an 
exclusion for any merger or consolidation in which the dissenter 
owns shares traded on a national securities exchange or the Nasdaq 
Stock Market and will receive publicly traded shares in the merger 
or consolidation.54  A much larger number of actions trigger 
appraisal rights in Minnesota, namely, (1) a merger (with no 
market exclusion comparable to the Delaware exclusion for 
publicly traded shares); (2) a plan of exchange; (3) a sale of all or 
substantially all of the assets of the corporation; and (4) any 
amendment to the articles that materially and adversely affects the 
rights or preferences of the dissenter’s shares by altering or 
abolishing a preferential, redemption, preemptive or voting right.55 
Procedures for asserting appraisal rights.  Under the DGCL, a 
shareholder asserting appraisal rights does not receive any payment 
for his or her shares until the court determines the fair value or the 
parties otherwise agree to a value, which may require years of costly 
discovery and litigation.56  Costs of the proceeding may be 
determined by the court and assessed against the parties as the 
court deems equitable under the circumstances.57 
 
 52. “Every state grants such rights upon the occurrence of certain mergers, 
and most states also provide for dissenters’ rights in the event of a corporation’s 
transfer of substantially all of its assets.”  MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 7.22, 
at 7-47.  See also COX, HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 22.24, at 22.72. 
 53. For a brief history of the development of appraisal rights statutes, see COX, 
HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 22.24, at 22.72-22.80. 
 54. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 262(a) - 262(b) (2000).  See generally 1 R. 
FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 9.43[B], at 9-89 to 9-92 (3d ed. Supp. 2001). 
 55. MINN. STAT. § 302A.471.  “The MBCA dissenters’ rights provisions are 
among the most liberal.”  MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 7.22, at 7-47.  See 
generally id. § 7.22, at 7-47 to 7-51. 
 56. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(i) (2000). 
 57. Id. at § 262(j). 
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Under the MBCA, however, the dissenting shareholder is paid 
up front the value of his or her shares as determined by the 
corporation.58  The dissenting shareholder continues the 
proceeding only to recover the amount, if any, by which fair value 
of his or her shares exceeds what has already been paid by the 
corporation.59  Costs are assessed against the corporation unless the 
court determines that the dissenting shareholder’s action in 
seeking value above that paid up front by the corporation was 
arbitrary, vexatious or not in good faith.60  In its discretion, the 
court may also award attorneys’ fees to the lead dissenter from the 
amount payable to all dissenters.61 
Important changes to Model Act not reflected in MBCA.  Until 
1999, the Model Act provisions were nearly identical to the MBCA 
provisions both with respect to actions triggering appraisal rights 
and procedures for asserting appraisal rights.62  In that year, 
however, the Model Act was amended to radically reduce the 
triggering actions and bring the Model Act closer in line with the 
Delaware provision and a contractual approach to corporate law.63  
Most importantly, the Model Act revision eliminated appraisal 
rights resulting from any articles amendment (other than 
amendments to effect a reverse stock split) and added a market out 
similar to the Delaware market out.64  Although the 1999 revisions 
to the Model Act retained appraisal rights in connection with 
certain sales of corporate assets,65 such revisions were accompanied 
by revisions to section 12.02 of the Model Act replacing the old “all 
 
 58. MINN. STAT. § 302A.473(5)(a) (2000).  See generally MATHESON & GARON, 
supra note 9, § 7.27, at 7-54 to 7-57. 
 59. MINN. STAT. § 302A.473(6) (2000).  See generally MATHESON & GARON, 
supra note 9, § 7.28, at 7-57. 
 60. MINN. STAT. § 302A.473(8) (2000).  See generally MATHESON & GARON, 
supra note 9, § 7.31, at 7-60 to 7-61. 
 61. MINN. STAT. § 302A.473(8). 
 62. Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Act, supra note 51, at 
405-06; Committee on Corporate Laws, Proposed Changes in the Model Act, supra note 
51, at 209. 
 63. Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Act, supra note 51, at 
405-06; Commitee on Corporate Laws, Proposed Changes in the Model Act, supra note 
51, at 209. 
 64. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a) (2000).  For a closer description of the 
1999 changes, see Historical Background to section 13.02 in 3 MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT ANN. 13-28 to 13-29 (3d ed. 2000); Bryn R. Vaaler, Major Revisions to the 
Mississippi Business Corporation Act – Fundamental Changes and Appraisal Rights, MISS. 
LAW., July-Aug.-Sept. 2000, at 28. 
 65. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a)(3) (2000). 
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss4/4
02_VAALER 5/23/2002  5:00 PM 
2002] SCRAP THE MINNESOTA CORPORATION ACT 1385 
or substantially all” language with a more concrete safe-harbor test 
intended to reduce the uncertainty involved in determining which 
sales of corporate assets require a shareholder vote and trigger 
appraisal rights.66  The 1999 Model Act revisions also added a 
specific provision that appraisal rights may be eliminated entirely 
or restricted with respect to any class or series of preferred stock, if 
such elimination or restriction is included in the terms of such class 
or series.67 
As of the end of 2001, no initiatives had been undertaken in 
Minnesota to bring the expansive appraisal rights provisions of the 
MBCA into line with the 1999 revisions to the Model Act.  As the 
1999 revisions are adopted in more and more Model Act states, the 
MBCA appraisal rights provisions will become even more 
exaggeratedly out of line with the balancing of rights in 
mainstream corporate law. 
E.  Unilateral Shareholder Approval of Articles Amendments 
The Model Act and the DGCL require approval by both the 
board of directors and the shareholders to amend the articles or 
certificate of incorporation once stock has been issued.68  The 
MBCA also requires both board and shareholder approval for 
amendments to the articles, but has a troubling exception to this 
rule.  If holders of shares aggregating 3% of the outstanding voting 
power of the shares entitled to vote propose an articles amendment 
 
 66. Id. § 12.02(a).  See also Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model 
Business Corporation Act – Fundamental Changes, 54 Bus. Law. 685 (1999).  For a 
closer description of the 1999 changes to section 12.02 and discussion of the 
uncertainty surrounding the old “all or substantially all” test, see MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT § 12.02 (Official Comment); Historical Background to section 12.02 in 
3 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. 12-17 to 12-18 (3d ed. 2000): 
As amended in 1999, section 12.02 represents an entirely different 
statutory approach to defining asset dispositions that represent such a 
fundamental change in the corporation’s business as to require 
shareholder approval.  As the Official Comment states, however, the basic 
test employed in section 12.02(a) – whether the disposition “would leave 
the corporation without a significant continuing business activity” – more 
accurately captures the way in which many courts apply the “all or 
substantially all assets” test used in other corporation statutes, including 
section 12.02 of the Model Act, prior to the 1999 amendments.  The 
quantitative safe-harbor provision in the second sentence of 12.02(a) is 
also unique to the Model Act, as amended. 
Id.  See also Vaaler, Major Revisions, supra note 64, at 28, 30 n.2. 
 67. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(c) (2000). 
 68. Id. § 10.03(b); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2000). 
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in Minnesota, that proposal must be submitted to shareholders for 
approval regardless of whether the board approves it.69  In essence, 
this means that shareholders of a Minnesota corporation have the 
unilateral ability (i.e., without board approval) to amend the 
articles of incorporation if a proposal to do so is initiated by a 
holder or holders or 3% of the outstanding stock.70  Although all 
U.S. corporate statutes permit shareholders the unilateral ability to 
adopt bylaw amendments, only a small minority of states permit 
unilateral shareholder approval of articles amendments.71 
The ability of shareholders to restrict the residual authority of 
directors to manage the business and affairs of the corporation 
through binding, unilateral shareholder action in the form of 
bylaw amendments has been a front-line corporate governance 
issue for U.S. public companies in recent years.72  Although the 
 
 69. Section 302A.135(2) of the MBCA provides in pertinent part: 
A resolution approved by the affirmative vote of a majority of the 
directors present, or proposed by a shareholder or shareholders holding 
three percent or more of the voting power of the shares entitled to vote, 
that sets forth the proposed amendment shall be submitted to a vote at 
the next regular or special meeting of the shareholders of which notice 
has not yet been given but still can be timely given. 
MINN. STAT. § 302A.135(2) (2000). 
 70. MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 2.19, at 2-34 to 2-37. 
 71. “All but 15 jurisdictions provide that the procedure for amending the 
articles of incorporation is initiated by the board of directors adopting a resolution 
setting forth the proposed amendment.”  3 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 10.03, at 
10-30 (3d ed. 2000) (Statutory Comparison).  Of those that do not restrict 
initiation to the board, some still require both board and shareholder approval for 
effectiveness of the amendment.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.504(A)(2) (Michie 
2000); CAL. CORP. CODE § 902(C) (West 2000); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 801 & 802 
(McKinney 2000).  Others are unclear on the required approvals.  See, e.g., LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:31 (West 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, §§ 70, 71 & 72 
(2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1611 (West 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
1701.71 (Anderson 2000).  Arizona permits shareholder initiation and unilateral 
approval, but only if so provided in the articles of incorporation.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
§ 10-1003(B) (2000).  Pennsylvania permits shareholder initiation and unilateral 
approval, but also permits an opting out of this right in the articles of 
incorporation.  PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1912 (West 2000).  South Carolina’s 
provision permitting shareholder initiation and unilateral approval is applicable 
only to corporations that are not publicly traded.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-10-103 
(Law. Co-op. 2000).  Only Colorado and North Dakota have clear and absolute 
(no opt out possible) provisions like Minnesota’s permitting holders of a 
designated percentage of shares (10% in Colorado; 5% in North Dakota) to 
initiate an amendment to the articles that may be unilaterally approved by 
shareholders.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-110-103 (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-19 
(2000). 
 72. For descriptions of the binding bylaw controversies, see generally John C. 
Coates IV & Bradley C. Faris, Second-Generation Shareholder Bylaws: Post-Quickturn 
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Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that such a restrictive bylaw 
amendment is permitted under the Oklahoma statute,73 
notwithstanding language indicating that board authority may only 
be restricted in the articles or certificate of incorporation,74 the 
Delaware courts have not yet spoken clearly on the issue.75 
 
Alternatives, 56 BUS. LAW. 1323 (2001); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate 
Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409 
(1998); Kate Margolis, Binding Shareholder Bylaw Amendments: An Antidote for the 
Poison Pill?, 67 MISS. L. J. 817 (1998). 
 73. See International Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Co. Inc., 975 
P.2d 907, 908 (Okla. 1999). 
 74. At issue in Fleming, 975 P.2d at 908, was the legitimacy under the 
Oklahoma statute of a bylaw proposed and adopted unilaterally by shareholders 
that required the board to eliminate the Fleming shareholders rights plan or 
poison pill and not to adopt another without shareholder approval.  The relevant 
provisions of the Oklahoma statute were nearly identical to the analogous 
provisions in the DGCL.  Coates & Faris, supra note 72, at 1329 n.27.  On one 
hand, the Oklahoma equivalent of section 141(a) of the DGCL, provides that 
“[t]he business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under 
the direction of a board of directors, except as maybe otherwise provided in this 
chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2000) 
(emphasis added).  Section 157 of the DGCL adds further specification of the 
board’s authority to adopt options and rights to issue stock, as in the case of a 
poison pill.  See Fleming, 975 P.2d at 910.  On the other hand, the Oklahoma 
equivalent of section 109 of the DGCL gives the stockholders explicit authority to 
amend the bylaws unilaterally to contain any provision “not inconsistent with law 
or with the certificate of incorporation.”  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b); accord 
Fleming, 975 P.2d at 910.  In essence, Fleming argued that the language in the 
section 141(a) and 157 equivalents meant that the board could only be so 
restricted in the certificate of incorporation and that a bylaw purporting to do so 
was invalid.  Fleming, 975 P.2d at 910.  The Teamsters argued that, absent a clear 
statutory mandate in favor of poison pills or a clearly contradictory provision in 
the certificate of incorporation, the provisions equivalent to sections 141(a), 157 
and 109 did not restrict the stockholders from adopting such a restrictive bylaw.  
Id.  The Oklahoma Supreme Court agreed with the Teamsters and upheld the 
legitimacy of binding stockholder bylaws under the Oklahoma statute so long as 
there was not an explicitly contradictory provision in the certificate of 
incorporation.  Id. at 912.  The Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that its 
interpretation might have been different if Oklahoma had a pill endorsement 
statute of the type contained in the Model Act and in the corporation statutes of 
many states.  Id. at 912-13.  See generally Hamermesh, supra note 72, at 421-25. 
 75. In Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics, Inc., 721 A.2d 
1281 (Del. 1998), the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that a so-called “no-hand” or 
“slow-hand” poison pill was invalid under section 141(a) of the DGCL because it 
purports to restrain the authority of the board (to redeem a poison pill) outside 
the certificate of incorporation: 
One of the most basic tenets of Delaware corporate law is that the board 
of directors has the ultimate responsibility for managing the business and 
affairs of the corporation.  Section 141(a) requires that any limitation on 
the board’s authority be set out in the certificate of incorporation. 
Id. at 1291.  Some commentators have viewed Quickturn as indicating that 
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Whether shareholders may act unilaterally to restrict the board 
by binding bylaw amendments may be largely irrelevant in 
Minnesota, since shareholders can clearly act unilaterally to amend 
the articles.76  Amendments to the MBCA in 1999 made a 
backhanded effort to address this idiosyncrasy by purportedly 
clarifying that unanimous shareholder approval would be required 
for any unilateral shareholder amendment of the articles that has 
the effect of restricting board authority.77  But it is unclear whether 
 
Delaware courts would view binding stockholder bylaws as being invalid.  E.g., 
Coates & Faris, supra note 72, at 1331 (“Attempts to distinguish the board’s actions 
in Quickturn from shareholders’ action to adopt bylaws face long odds.”).  
However, that precise issue was not before the court in Quickturn.  See General 
DataComm Indus., Inc. v. Wisconsin Inv. Bd., 731 A.2d 818, 821-22 (Del. Ch. 
1999) (indicating that Quickturn had not resolved the issue of validity under 
Delaware law of binding anti-option-repricing bylaw proposal).  In the last several 
years, the corporate law validity of binding shareholder bylaw proposals has been 
contested most frequently in no-action letter requests by corporate management 
seeking to exclude such proposals from their proxy materials pursuant to SEC 
Rule 14a-8(i)(1) (“not proper subject for action by shareholders” under applicable 
state law) or SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(2) (“would, if implemented, cause the company to 
violate any state, federal, or foreign law to which it is subject.”).  17 C.F.R. §§ 
240.14a-8(i)(1) & 240.14a-8(i)(2) (2001); see also Mark J. Loewenstein, Delaware as 
Demon: Twenty-Five Years after Professor Cary’s Polemic, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 497, 532-
36 (2000).  Until recently, the SEC staff had generally refused to concur in 
exclusion of such proposals under either Rule 14a-8(i)(1) or 14a-8(i)(2) on 
grounds that the validity of such bylaws involves an “unsettled point of Delaware 
law.”  PLM Int’l Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 28, 1997).  More recently, the 
staff has concurred in exclusion of one such proposal in reliance on the opinion 
of Delaware counsel based on Quickturn. See General Dynamics Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter (Mar. 5, 2001). 
 76. The Minnesota equivalent of section 141(a) of the DGCL does not 
directly refer to the articles of incorporation.  Section 302A.201(1) provides in 
pertinent part: “The business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by or 
under the direction of a board, subject to the provisions of subdivision 2 and 
section 302A.457.”  MINN. STAT. § 302A.201(1) (2000).  Subdivision 2 of section 
302A.201 provides that “[t]he holders of the shares entitled to vote for directors of 
the corporation may, by unanimous affirmative vote, take any action that this 
chapter requires or permits the board to take.”  Id. § 302A.201(2).  Section 
302A.457 provides for shareholder control agreements pursuant to which the 
management structure of a Minnesota corporation may be customized by contract 
signed by all shareholders.  Id. § 302A.457. 
 77. The 1999 amendments to the MBCA came in part, no doubt, in response 
to an attempted binding anti-pill bylaw proposal at one of Minnesota’s most well 
known public companies, Dayton Hudson Corporation (which changed its name 
in 2000 to Target Corporation).  See Dayton Hudson Corp., SEC No-Action Letter 
(Mar. 25, 1999); Target Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 3, 2000).  The 
proponent argued that the reasoning in Fleming should be followed even though 
the MBCA contains a pill endorsement statute in section 302A.409(3).  See supra 
note 74.  The company argued that the reasoning of the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s Quickturn decision should instead be followed and that, in any case, 
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a Minnesota court would read the amended provisions in this 
restrictive a manner.78  Consequently, it remains to be seen whether 
the balance of power between managements and shareholders at 
public companies incorporated in Minnesota is set entirely 
differently than at public companies incorporated in almost any 
other state. 
F.  Who Can Call a Special Meeting of Shareholders 
The default rule under Delaware law is that only the board of 
directors can call a special meeting of shareholders.79  Section 228 
of the DGCL permits shareholders to approve a measure by non-
unanimous written consent without a meeting, but this right to 
non-unanimous consent solicitation may be negated in the 
certificate of incorporation.80  The certificates of incorporation of 
well counseled Delaware public corporations contain a negation of 
non-unanimous consent solicitations under section 228.81  So, in a 
 
section 302A.201 indicated that any charter amendment – bylaw or articles – 
pursuant to which the shareholders took action required or permitted to be taken 
by the board must be adopted unanimously.  See supra note 76.  To bolster this last 
argument, the legislature amended sections 302A.111(5) (optional provisions in 
articles) and 302A.181(1) (bylaw amendments) in 1999 to make specific cross-
reference to section 302A.201.  1999 Minn. Laws ch. 85, art. 1.  The intent of the 
amendments, apparently, is to give greater force to the argument that the 
unanimity requirement for shareholders to take action normally reserved to the 
board in section 302A.201(2) is meant to cover the full range of all possible 
restrictions on board activity imposed by shareholder action.  A more natural 
reading would be that shareholders in a closely held corporation, if they are going 
to wholesale supplant the board’s management role in one or more areas, must do 
so by unanimous action.  The SEC staff permitted exclusion of the proposal in 
1999 based on a technical glitch unrelated to the unanimity requirement.  In 
2000, the same proponent corrected the glitch and re-proposed.  Although the 
legislature had bolstered the unanimity argument in the 1999 amendment, the 
company settled with the proponent before the SEC staff could resolve the dispute 
over the validity of the proposal.  In the settlement, Target Corporation agreed to 
let its current pill expire in 2001 and not to adopt another pill without majority 
approval by independent directors.  Target Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 3, 
2000). 
 78. Would a shareholder articles amendment that prevents the board from 
adopting a poison pill or re-pricing an option constitute the taking of an action 
that this chapter requires or permits the board to take within the meaning of 
section 302A.201(2)?  Is prevention of an action by the board the same as taking 
an action?  Would a Minnesota court find that the ambiguous language of sections 
302A.201(2) would really prevent less than all shareholders from making any 
charter amendment that somehow restricted the residual authority of the board? 
 79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d) (2000). 
 80. Id. § 228(a). 
 81. See R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI, ET AL., MEETINGS OF STOCKHOLDERS 11-42 (3d ed. 
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well-counseled Delaware corporation, a matter may be presented 
for shareholder vote only with the cooperation of the board of 
directors.  This is an important point in the corporate governance 
balance of power in public corporations.  Hostile bidders must 
unseat the board in order to put a matter to shareholder vote at a 
special meeting, or they must present their proposals at the annual 
meeting.82 
As already noted, the MBCA contains an absolute provision 
giving the right to call a special meeting to shareholders possessing 
10% of the outstanding voting power.83  The MBCA provides that 
the ownership level increases to 25% (unless a lower threshold is 
prescribed in the articles or bylaws) if the meeting is being called 
“for the purpose of considering any action to directly or indirectly 
facilitate or effect a business combination, including any action to 
change or otherwise affect the composition of the board of 
directors for that purpose.”84 
Since most state statutes give an absolute right to shareholders 
at some percentage ownership level to call a special meeting,85 this 
attribute of the MBCA is not an idiosyncrasy of Minnesota and 
cannot in fairness be part of an indictment of the MBCA.  In fact, 
the inability of shareholders to call a special meeting is perhaps 
more properly viewed as an idiosyncrasy of Delaware.  But the 
Minnesota 10% threshold is low and increases to 25% only if the 
somewhat ambiguous “business combination” purpose test is met.86  
 
Supp. 2002) (“From management’s perspective, recent developments have 
demonstrated the desirability of eliminating or restricting the right to act by 
written consent.”); Herzel, supra note 40, at 142 (“Elimination of consents can 
reasonably be considered a mild antitakeover measure, but, unlike other 
antitakeover devices, it does not appear to encounter much (if any) resistance 
from large stockholders.”).  Cases in which the failure to negate non-unanimous 
consent solicitation has had dire consequences are numerous.  See generally Herzel, 
supra note 40, at 138-42.  Delaware courts reserve their most withering standard of 
review for board actions found to be aimed primarily at impeding a shareholder 
vote once underway.  See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 
1988). 
 82. For discussion of the importance of eliminating the non-unanimous 
consent procedure from the context of hostile bids for public companies, see 
Herzel, supra note 40, at 138-42. 
 83. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 84. MINN. STAT. § 302A.433(1)(e) (2000). 
 85. COX, HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 13.3, at 13.27. 
 86. It is almost guaranteed that, if the issue ever becomes important, the 
ambiguity of the “business combination” purpose will be an issue in litigation as it 
was in Banco Panamericano, Inc. v. Health Risk Mgmt., Inc., 78 F. Supp.2d 804 (N.D. 
Ill. 1999).  In that case, a party related to a hostile bidder attempted to call a 
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Under the Model Act, the level may be increased in the articles of 
incorporation to 25% without regard to the action to be taken at 
the meeting.87 
I can certainly understand arguments in favor of permitting 
shareholders to call special meetings.  But the managements of our 
public corporation clients generally want to retain the control 
inherent in having the sole right to call such meetings.  Although 
the Delaware level of control may be used to further management 
entrenchment in the face of hostile bidders or dissident 
shareholders, it is tempered by the fiduciary obligations of 
management under the enhanced scrutiny standards devised by the 
Delaware courts.88 
The point is this: under Delaware law, my clients have the 
option of retaining this control or permitting shareholders to call 
special meetings or solicit non-unanimous consents.  Under the 
Model Act, my clients at least have greater leeway to increase the 
required threshold.  Under the MBCA, there is no option and no 
leeway. 
G.  Limit on Bylaw Amendments 
The Model Act, the DGCL and the MBCA all generally permit 
either the board or the shareholders to amend the corporation’s 
bylaws unilaterally.89  The MBCA has, however, a bothersome 
overlay of limitation on the board’s power.  Section 302A.181(2) 
provides: 
After the adoption of the initial bylaws, the board shall 
not adopt, amend, or repeal a bylaw fixing a quorum for 
 
special meeting for shareholders to vote on removal of the company’s poison pill.  
The federal district court certified to the Minnesota Supreme Court the question 
of whether a meeting called by such a shareholder for such a purpose was subject 
to the 10% or 25% threshold.  Id.  The case was settled before the Minnesota 
Supreme Court could decide the issue. 
 87. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.02(a)(2) (2000). 
 88. Delaware courts reserve their most withering standard of review for board 
actions found to be aimed primarily at impeding a shareholder vote once 
underway.  See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988); 
Wisconsin Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp.,  No. CIV.A. 17637, 2000 WL 1805376 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000). 
 89. Under the Model Act and the MBCA, the board has the unilateral ability 
to amend the bylaws as a default rule.  MINN. STAT. § 302A.181(2) (2000); MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20 (b) (2000).  Under the DGCL, an opt-in provision must be 
included in the certificate of incorporation in order for the board to have this 
ability.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2000). 
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meetings of shareholders, prescribing procedures for 
removing directors or filling vacancies in the board, or 
fixing the number of directors or their classifications, 
qualifications, or terms of office, but may adopt or amend 
a bylaw to increase the number of directors.90 
This prohibition is not qualified by materiality of the change or by 
its adverse effect on the rights of shareholders.  It is just a 
blunderbuss prohibition on any change, including – one must 
assume – simple wording changes or typographical corrections 
having no substantive effect on shareholder rights. 
From a substantive standpoint, shareholders are relatively able 
to protect themselves from truncation of their rights by unilateral 
bylaw amendments by the board of directors.  Under all U.S. 
corporate statutes, the shareholders retain the right to change any 
amendment effected by the board.91  Moreover, unilateral board 
amendments to the bylaws truncating shareholder rights are 
subject to enhanced scrutiny under the fiduciary duty 
jurisprudence of the Delaware courts.92  So, it is hard to see why a 
flat prohibition of this kind is needed or particularly helpful for 
shareholders. 
A scenario in which this prohibition proves bothersome occurs 
regularly in my firm’s practice.  A Minnesota corporate client hires 
us after others have performed its organizational work.  A review of 
its bylaws reveals that they are not well put together, and the 
corporation would be well advised to adopt a new set of bylaws in 
one of our standard forms for Minnesota corporations.  In other 
states, this could be done as a matter of routine housekeeping by 
the board of directors alone.  In Minnesota, the limitation in 
 
 90. MINN. STAT. § 302A.181(2) (2000).  See MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, 
at 2-45. 
 91. For all its shareholder and minority protection posturing, the MBCA is 
less protective of shareholders with regard to bylaw amendments than the Model 
Act.  Shareholders have the right to override board amendments under both 
section 10.20 of the Model Act and section 302A.181(2) of the MBCA.  MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20 (2000); MINN. STAT. § 302A.181(2) (2000).  Under the 
Model Act, shareholders may also lock in their change by providing that the board 
may not amend, repeal or reinstate a bylaw that they have amended either in the 
articles of incorporation or in the bylaws.  MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20 (b)(1)-
(2) (2000).  Under the MBCA, such a lock-in must be contained in the articles of 
incorporation.  MINN. STAT. § 302A.181(2) (2000).  This limitation has been used 
by at least one Minnesota issuer to combat a binding bylaw proposal that included 
a lock-in provision in the bylaw text.  See Target Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 
3, 2000). 
 92. See supra note 88. 
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section 302A.181(2) almost certainly means that shareholders must 
approve this essentially clerical change.93 
H.  Overly Broad Control Share Acquisition Statute 
If you like anti-takeover statutes, you will love Minnesota.  We 
have many more anti-takeover statutes than Delaware.  Delaware 
has a business combination statute (or third generation anti-
takeover statute) in DGCL section 203.94  The MBCA has an 
analogous business combination statute in section 302A.673.95  
 
 93. Of course, this assumes that one is complying with the prohibition in 
section 302A.181(2).  How many times per year would you expect that bylaws are 
amended in Minnesota without compliance with section 302A.181(2)? 
 94. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2000).  Section 203 of the DGCL restricts 
certain business combination transactions between a shareholder acquiring 15% 
or more (designated as an “interested” shareholder) of the voting stock and any 
Delaware corporation with securities traded on a national exchange, quoted on 
the Nasdaq Stock Market or owned of record by at least 2,000 shareholders.  
Unless an exception is available, the statute provides that for three years after the 
15% threshold is exceeded, the corporation cannot have a merger, sale of 
substantial assets, loan, substantial issuance of stock, plan of liquidation, or 
reincorporation involving the interested shareholder or its affiliates.  Shareholders 
may opt out of section 203 at any time by majority vote, but the decision is not 
effective for one year. 
  There are a number of important exceptions to the basic prohibition of 
section 203.  First, the Delaware statute does not prohibit a business combination 
if, prior to becoming an interested shareholder, the board of directors has 
approved the business combination or the transaction which resulted in the 
shareholder passing the 15% threshold.  Second, section 203 does not apply if the 
interested shareholder acquires 85% of the target’s outstanding voting stock 
(excluding shares held by management or held in employee benefit plans in 
which the employees do not have a confidential right to vote) in the transaction in 
which the 15% threshold is exceeded.  Third, a business combination is 
permissible if approved by the board and authorized at an annual or special 
meeting of shareholders, and not by written consent, by the affirmative vote of 
two-thirds of the outstanding shares held by disinterested shareholders.  Finally, if 
the target corporation, with the support of the majority of its continuing directors, 
proposes at any time another merger or sale or does not oppose another tender 
offer for at least 50% of its shares, the interested shareholder is released from the 
three-year prohibition and free to compete with the target-supported transaction.  
Id. 
 95. MINN. STAT. § 302A.673 (2000).  Section 302A.673 of the MBCA is quite 
similar to its Delaware analog, see supra note 94, except: (1) the interested 
shareholder threshold is 10% rather than 15%; (2) the prohibition period for 
business combinations is four years from the time the shareholder passes the 
threshold instead of three years; and (3) there are no equivalents to the Delaware 
exceptions for acquisition of 85% of voting stock, for two-thirds shareholder 
approval at a shareholder meeting or for management approval of a competing 
transaction or tender offer.  Section 302A.673 applies to “issuing public 
corporations,” defined as any Minnesota corporation with at least 100 
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Minnesota also has a control share acquisition statute (or second 
generation anti-takeover statute) in section 302A.671,96 a so-called 
“other constituencies” provision in section 302A.25197 and a “fair 
price” provision in section 302A.67598 among other provisions 
specially applicable to takeovers.99  Delaware has no statutory 
equivalents to these. 
As a trap for the unwary, I believe the control share acquisition 
statute is the real standout in Minnesota’s anti-takeover arsenal.  
The statute requires approval by the disinterested shareholders of 
any “control share acquisition” of stock of an “issuing public 
corporation” (defined as any Minnesota corporation with at least 
one hundred shareholders or with at least fifty shareholders if the 
Minnesota corporation is a publicly held corporation).100  A 
 
shareholders (or with at least fifty shareholders if the Minnesota corporation is a 
publicly held corporation).  Issuing public corporations that are publicly held are 
automatically subject to section 302A.673 of the MBCA unless they opt out by 
charter amendment; issuing public corporations that are not publicly held are 
subject to section 302A.673 only if they opt in by charter amendment.  MATHESON 
& GARON, supra note 9, §§ 8.14-8.20 at 8-28 to 8-44. 
 96. MINN. STAT. § 302A.671 (2000).  See infra notes 100 to 114 and 
accompanying text. 
 97. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251(5) (2000).  This section provides that: 
In discharging the duties of the position of director, a director may, in 
considering the best interests of the corporation, consider the interests of 
the corporation’s employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors, the 
economy of the state and nation, community and societal considerations, 
and the long-term as well as short-term interests of the corporation and 
its shareholders including the possibility that these interests may be best 
served by the continued independence of the corporation. 
Id.  Although Minnesota courts have not interpreted the scope and effect of this 
provision, it appears to afford the board substantial flexibility to give weight to 
constituencies and to timeframes other than the shareholders and their 
immediate value gains in deciding on a course of action in connection with 
takeovers and otherwise.  Delaware case law has indicated that such “other 
constituencies” may normally be considered by the board, but that enhancing 
value to shareholders should be the primary consideration in all cases and should 
be the exclusive consideration in some cases, including sale of control of the 
corporation.  See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 
173, 182 (Del. 1986); Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 
1985). 
 98. MINN. STAT. § 302A.675 (2000).  This section prohibits an offeror from 
acquiring shares of a publicly held corporation within two years following a 
takeover offer except upon terms equivalent to those of the earlier takeover offer, 
unless approved by a committee of the board’s disinterested directors before the 
takeover offer.  MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, §§ 8.21-8.25, at 8-45 to 8-50. 
 99. See generally MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, §§ 8.26-8.51, at 8-51 to 8-88. 
 100. MINN. STAT. § 302A.671 (2000).  The definition of “issuing public 
corporation” is contained in section 302A.011(39) of the MBCA.  Id. § 
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“control share acquisition” includes any acquisition of beneficial 
ownership of shares that exceeds specified levels of voting power 
(20%, 33-1/3% and 50%) of the outstanding stock of the target 
“issuing public corporation.”101  There are a number of important 
exclusions intended primarily to distinguish hostile acquisitions 
from transactions negotiated and approved by management and 
shareholders, including exclusions for shares acquired (a) in a 
merger, plan of exchange or sale of asset transaction,102 (b) directly 
by purchase from the target issuer,103 (c) in a cash tender offer for 
all outstanding shares if the offer has been approved in advance by 
the board of directors of the target,104 and (d) by employee benefit 
plans.105 
If the bidder fails to obtain the required shareholder approval 
for a control share acquisition, the shares acquired (a) may not be 
voted by the bidder beyond the 20% threshold level (or such 
higher threshold level as shareholders have approved)106 and (b) 
are subject to certain redemption rights at the option of the 
target.107  The statute essentially requires the bidder to wage a proxy 
contest to obtain the necessary approval and delays the acquiror’s 
purchase up to fifty-five days while a special shareholders’ meeting 
is held.108 
Although adopted by about half of the states in the United 
States,109 control share acquisition acts are relatively ineffective and 
of questionable value as anti-takeover statutes.110  They were put 
into place at a time when front-end loaded, two-tier takeover 
structures were common and were intended to prevent such 
coercive techniques from stampeding shareholders into a partial 
 
302A.011(39).  See generally MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, §§ 8.3-8.12 at 8-8 to 
8-27. 
 101. MINN. STAT. § 302A.011(38) (2000). 
 102. Id. § 302A.011(38)(d). 
 103. Id. § 302A.011(38)(e). 
 104. Id. § 302A.011(38)(h)-(i). 
 105. Id. § 302A.011(38)(g). 
 106. MINN. STAT. § 302A.671(4)(a) (2000). 
 107. Id. § 302A.671(6). 
 108. Id. § 302A.671(3) (requirement that meeting to vote on control share 
acquisition be held within fifty-five days of request). 
 109. See 1 MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS 5-
28 n.7 (2001) (listing twenty-six states with such statutes). 
 110. For discussion of the reasons why the Delaware bar decided against 
recommending adoption of a control share acquisition statute in that state, see 
Lewis S. Black, Jr., Why Delaware is Wary of Anti-Takeover Law, WALL ST. J., July 10, 
1987, at 18, col. 4. 
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tender offer.111  Even then, it was far from clear that the delays 
required for a shareholder vote would necessarily stop a concerted 
bidder.112  Many criticize the statutes as providing a ready means of 
putting the company in play by forcing management into a 
shareholder plebiscite that will very likely go against them.113  
Moreover, in an age of any-and-all-share tender offers, even if the 
vote goes against the bidder, it may be to no avail.  A hostile bidder 
that has acquired at least 80.1% of the outstanding shares may still 
be able to circumvent the effect of the act, since the bidder can 
then outvote the 19.9% of outstanding shares remaining in other 
hands, even if the right to vote were eliminated from the bidder’s 
shares in excess of the 20% threshold.114 
The main problem with the Minnesota control share 
acquisition statute is not its dubious value in the anti-takeover 
context in which it was intended to operate – it is its over breadth 
and extension into transactions far from the takeover context.  
First, the statute applies to a “control share acquisition” even if it 
has nothing to do with a hostile takeover.  Second, the definition of 
 
 111. LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 109, at 5-28. 
 112. “The Delaware committee was . . . skeptical of the claim that the mere 
existence of a 50-day wait would deter tender offers.  The market’s usual creativity 
in connection with takeovers has extended to financing matters.”  Black, supra 
note 110, at 18, col. 4. 
 113.  
But wouldn’t the result be a stockholder plebiscite on every offer, and 
wouldn’t the stockholder vote always favor the bidder or any new bidder 
that offered a greater premium? . . . It seemed likely that institutions 
would vote for a short-term profit.  So would arbitragers who could 
acquire shares before the record date for the stockholders meeting or 
purchase shares with proxies attached. . . . Almost anyone who wants to 
[put the company in play] or even to harass management, could simply 
notify the company of his intention to make a control-share acquisition 
and trigger the statutory stockholder plebiscite.  The ensuing meeting, 
notice and other publicity provide a cheap means to publicize the 
company’s availability for sale. 
Id. 
 114. This depends on the reading given to the term “voting power” in section 
302A.671 and the term “entitled to vote” in sections 302A.443, 302A.437 and 
elsewhere. 
No published Minnesota case has decided the issue of whether such 
shares acquired in a control share acquisition have “voting power” and 
are “entitled to vote.”  However, the possibility that an acquiring person 
could acquire absolute voting control of a corporation without receiving 
shareholder approval under the CSAA by acquiring more than 80% of its 
voting stock clearly was not envisioned by the Minnesota legislature and 
is contrary to the policy behind its adoption. 
MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 8.11, at 8-26 to 8-27. 
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“control share acquisition” (along with related definitions of 
“acquiring person,” “beneficial owner” and “beneficial ownership”) 
is incredibly vague and far-reaching.  It includes not only 
acquisitions of target shares, but changes in organizational or 
ownership structure of the owner of the shares.  A reorganization 
of the general partner of a limited partnership that owns a 21% 
interest in a Minnesota “issuing public corporation” could 
constitute a “control share acquisition” requiring approval by 
disinterested shareholders. 
Finally, unlike the Minnesota business combination statute 
(which does not apply to issuing public corporations that are not 
publicly held unless they opt in by charter amendment), the 
Minnesota control share acquisition statute applies to all issuing 
public corporations unless they opt out by charter amendment.  An 
incredibly broad range of transactions involving shares of non-
public Minnesota corporations may therefore run afoul of the 
statute in situations having nothing to do with the anti-takeover 
purposes of the statute. 
It is amazing how often the Minnesota Control Share 
Acquisition Act poses impediments to routine transactions.  Given 
its dubious value as an anti-takeover statute and its potential for 
mischief, my general advice to corporate clients is to opt out.  But 
its opt-out status is another trap for the unwary.  I would bet that 
the Minnesota control share acquisition act is triggered 
unknowingly almost every day. 
I would not mind seeing it repealed altogether.  The Delaware 
Legislature, after extended study by the bar, decided to adopt a 
relatively balanced business combination statute and to pass on a 
control share acquisition statute.115  By contrast, Minnesota’s 
control share acquisition statute was put into its present form and 
most of the other Minnesota anti-takeover provisions were adopted 
in a fevered special session of the Minnesota Legislature specially 
called by the Minnesota Governor when a favorite publicly held 
Minnesota corporation came under siege by an out-of-state 
 
 115. See Black, supra note 110, at 18, col. 4.  See also Arthur Oesterle, Delaware’s 
Takeover Statute: Of Chills, Pills, Standstills, and Who Gets Iced, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 
880 (1988) (“[DGCL section 203] thus seems to represent a mid-course 
compromise between those who view hostile takeovers as destructive and those 
who view them as beneficial”). 
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bidder.116  Maybe the time has come to do some pruning in the 
Minnesota anti-takeover bramble. 
At a minimum, the Minnesota Control Share Acquisition Act 
should be made an opt-in statute for Minnesota issuing public 
corporations that are not publicly held. 
I.  Unbridled Judicial Intervention 
I taught Corporations in a state law school outside of 
Minnesota for eleven years.  The statutory supplement we used in 
my class included the DGCL, the Model Act and selected excerpts 
from other state corporation statutes representing alternative 
approaches to common problems or unique or extremist 
provisions.117  Section 302A.751 of the MBCA was included in our 
statutory supplement as an extremist example of statutory 
authorization for court intervention.118  Its notoriety is, 
unfortunately, well deserved. 
Dissolution statutes generally.  All U.S. corporation statutes 
have some type of voluntary or involuntary dissolution provision.119  
The provisions in the DGCL, MBCA and Model Act governing 
voluntary dissolution by action of a majority of outstanding shares 
are quite comparable.120  The provisions for involuntary dissolution 
by court order in a proceeding initiated by a shareholder or a 
creditor are very different.121 
Statutory provisions for involuntary dissolution provide an 
essential escape mechanism for oppressed minority shareholders in 
closely held corporations who have not provided themselves with a 
 
 116. See MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 8.1, at 8-5 n.1 (discussing Dayton 
Hudson Corporation); Douglas J. Nill, Minnesota’s Corporate Takeover and Shareholder 
Protection Act of 1987: Economic Folly or Constitutional Viability – Or Both?, 11 HAMLINE 
L. REV. 281, 284-86 (1988). 
 117. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: 
STATUTES, RULES AND FORMS (eds. 1995-1999). 
 118. Id. 
 119. COX, HAZEN & O’NEAL, supra note 13, § 26.2, at 26.4 & § 26.5, at 26.12-
26.17; Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders’ Reasonable 
Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 200-11 (1988). 
 120. One major difference is that Minnesota is among a minority of states 
permitting voluntary dissolution by shareholder action alone, whereas the DGCL 
and Model Act require both board and shareholder approval.  Compare DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 275–285 (2000) with MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.721-302A.7291 (2000) and 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 14.02-14.08 (2000).  See also Thompson, supra note 119, 
at 200 (“A few states exclude the board from the ‘gatekeeper’ function and permit 
dissolution by action of the shareholders alone.”). 
 121. See infra notes 127 to 132 and accompanying text. 
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contractual means of extracting the value of their investment and 
exiting.122  Since a closely held corporation has no active trading 
market for its shares, a shareholder who wants to sell shares may 
have little or no ability to find a buyer.123  A shareholder who has a 
falling out with other shareholders in a closely held corporation 
may find that the only market for his or her shares consists of those 
other shareholders with whom he or she is at odds.  The economic 
pressure on an outcast shareholder in a closely held corporation 
may be even greater if the outcast’s primary income is derived as an 
employee of the corporation.124 
Putting contractual buy-sell mechanisms in place at the outset 
is an essential part of closely held corporate planning and 
organization and can help reduce the risk of hardship and 
disputes.125  Buy-sell arrangements can provide for purchase of 
shares upon changes in circumstances such as death, disability or 
termination of employment.126  Even well conceived buy-sell 
agreements may not, however, anticipate all problems arising from 
a falling out among shareholder-participants. 
The only general-purpose provision for involuntary dissolution 
in the DGCL empowers the Court of Chancery to revoke or forfeit 
the charter of any corporation for “abuse, misuse or nonuse of its 
corporate powers, privileges or franchises.”127  Delaware has a 
special provision, however, for court-ordered dissolution in the 
event of disagreement between the two shareholders of a Delaware 
corporation that serves as a 50/50 joint venture.128  The DGCL also 
permits the shareholders of a corporation electing to be treated as 
a Delaware close corporation to provide in the charter for court-
ordered dissolution at the will of any shareholder or upon any 
specified event or contingency.129  With careful planning, therefore, 
 
 122. Thompson, supra note 119, at 194–99.  See also Anthony & Boraas, 
Betrayed, supra note 2, at 1174-76; Olson, Elixir, supra note 2, at 627-29. 
 123. Thompson, supra note 119, at 196 (“In a close corporation setting, the 
norm of free transferability of shares is illusory.”). 
 124. Id. at 197. 
 125. See generally HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEALS’S CLOSE 
CORPORATIONS § 7.03, at 7-13 to 7-16 (2001). 
 126. Id. 
 127. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 284(a) (2000).  See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra 
note 54, § 10.24, at 10-58 to 10-59. 
 128. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 273 (2000).  See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra 
note 54, § 10.11, at 10-29 to 10-31. 
 129. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 355 (2000).  See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra 
note 54, § 14.10, at 14-8. 
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a Delaware close corporation can provide for dissolution as liberal 
as in a partnership.  And, of course, contractual buy-sell 
arrangements can provide desired exits for shareholders without 
bringing dissolution into play at all. 
The Model Act provision on involuntary dissolution in section 
14.30 embodies the standard for current involuntary dissolution 
provisions in U.S. corporate statutes.130  Section 14.30 provides that 
a court has discretion to order the involuntary dissolution of the 
corporation in a proceeding by a shareholder who establishes that 
(1) the directors are in deadlock that cannot be broken by the 
shareholders; (2) “the directors or those in control . . . have acted, 
are acting or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive or 
fraudulent;” (3) the shareholders are deadlocked and have been 
unable to elect directors for at least two consecutive annual 
meetings; or (4) “the corporate assets are being misapplied or 
wasted.”131  “Oppression” is the most frequently cited ground in 
petitions for dissolution by minority shareholders who have not 
provided for an exit strategy in a buy-sell agreement.132 
As many commentators have observed, courts have been 
reluctant to dissolve a going concern even when faced with a clear 
case of “oppression” of a minority shareholder without a 
contractual exit strategy.133  In most cases, such an oppressed 
shareholder’s problems may be satisfactorily remedied by a buyout 
at fair value of his or her shares instead of the dismantling of the 
corporation.134  In fact, most dissolution proceedings actually result 
 
 130. Dooley & Goldman, supra note 10, at 747 (“The Model Act’s involuntary 
dissolution remedy, section 14.30(2), is typical of like provisions found in most 
state statutes.”). 
 131. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30(2)(i)-(iv) (2000). 
 132. Dooley & Goldman, supra note 10, at 747. 
 133. Id. at 748.  See also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 (2000) (Official 
Comment) (“If the petitioning shareholder proves one or more grounds under 
section 14.30(2), he is entitled to some form of relief but many courts have 
hesitated to award dissolution, the only form of relief explicitly provided, because 
of its adverse effects on shareholders, employees, and others who may have an 
interest in the continuation of the business.”). 
 134. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 (2000) (Official Comment) 
(“Commentators have observed that it is rarely necessary to dissolve the 
corporation and liquidate its assets in order to provide relief: the rights of the 
petitioning shareholder are fully protected by liquidating only his interest and 
paying the fair value of his shares while permitting the remaining shareholders to 
continue the business.  In fact, it appears that most dissolution proceedings result 
in a buyout of one or another of the disputants’ shares either pursuant to a 
statutory buyout provision or a negotiated settlement.”). 
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in a buyout of one or another of the parties involved either 
pursuant to a statutory provision or a negotiated settlement.135  
Some courts have interpreted their states’ involuntary dissolution 
statutes as implicitly including authority to order a buyout as a sort 
of “alternative” remedy.136  Other states have included explicit 
authority in their dissolution statutes for courts to order a buyout as 
a discretionary alternative remedy.137 
In 1990, the Model Act introduced new section 14.34 to 
provide explicitly for a court-ordered shareholder buyout.138  If a 
shareholder files a petition for involuntary dissolution under 
section 14.30, the corporation or one or more other shareholders 
have ninety days under section 14.34 to file with the court an 
irrevocable election to purchase the petitioner’s shares.139  Once 
the election is filed, the parties have sixty days to agree on a 
purchase price.140  If they fail to do so, the court must “determine 
the fair value of the petitioner’s shares.”141  The corporation then 
has ten days to accept the court’s fair value determination or to file 
for voluntary dissolution.142 
Section 14.34 does not alter the grounds upon which a 
shareholder may file for involuntary dissolution.143  If the 
corporation and other shareholders believe the petitioner’s claims 
of “oppression” are weak, they may choose not to make a buyout 
election under section 14.34 and just fight out the action for 
involuntary dissolution.144  Section 14.34 authorizes neither the 
court nor the petitioning shareholder to initiate the statutory 
buyout; it is a purely optional, defensive response to the dissolution 
petition that may be exercised by those most concerned with 
continuation of the corporate business.145 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Thompson, supra note 119, at 194. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Historical Background to section 14.34 in 3 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. 
14-154 to 14-155 (3d ed. 2000). 
 139. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34(a)-(b) (2000). 
 140. Id. § 14.34(c). 
 141. Id. § 14.34(d). 
 142. Id. § 14.34(g). 
 143. Bringing a claim alleging one of the grounds for dissolution under 
section 14.30(2) is a prerequisite to applicability of Section 14.34.  Id. § 14.34 cmt. 
1. 
 144. Id. § 14.34 cmt. 2. 
 145. Id. (“The election to purchase is wholly voluntary.”). 
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MBCA section 302A.751.  Section 302A.751 is, at its base, an 
involuntary dissolution statute very comparable to section 14.30 of 
the Model Act.146  It has two very major differences. 
First, section 302A.751 explicitly expands the court’s authority 
beyond dissolution and empowers it also to “grant any equitable 
relief it deems just and reasonable in the circumstances.”147  The 
 
 146. Section 302A.751 was, in its original form, based largely on the 
involuntary dissolution provisions of section 97 of the Model Act (the predecessor 
to current section 14.30), although material from a New Jersey statute was fused to 
the initial form of the statute as well.  See MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 (2000) 
(Reporter’s Notes); MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 10.8, at 10-18 n.73.  “The 
only remedy explicitly mentioned in the predecessor statute [to section 302A.751] 
was dissolution.”  Id. at 10-18 n.76. 
 147. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(1) (2000).  The principal author of the 1983 
amendments to Section 302A.751, Professor Joseph Olson, lists “[a]t least fifteen 
types of remedies . . . available to the court,” including: 
(1) Cancelling, altering or enjoining any resolution or other act of the 
corporation; (2) Directing or prohibiting any act of the corporation or of 
shareholders, directors, officers or other persons party to the action; (3) 
Canceling or altering any provision contained in the articles of 
incorporation or by-laws of the corporation; (4) Removing from office 
any director or officer, or ordering that a person be appointed a director 
or officer; (5) Requiring an accounting with respect to any [business] 
matters in dispute; (6) Appointing a custodian to manage the business 
and affairs of the corporation; (7) Appointing a ‘special fiscal agent’ to 
report to the court relating to the continued operation of the 
corporation, as a protection to its minority stockholders, and the 
retention of jurisdiction of the case by the court for that purpose; (8) 
Retention of jurisdiction of the case by the court for the protection of the 
minority stockholders without appointment of custodian [receiver] or 
‘special fiscal agent’; (9) Appointing a provisional director who shall have 
all the rights, powers, and duties of a duly elected director and shall serve 
for the term and under the conditions established by the court; (10) 
Awarding damages to any aggrieved party in addition to, or in lieu of, any 
other relief granted; (11) Ordering the payment of dividends; (12) 
Issuing an injunction to prohibit continuing acts of unfairly prejudicial 
conduct; (13) Permitting minority stockholders to purchase additional 
stock under conditions specified by the court; (14) Ordering dissolution 
of the corporation at a specified date, to become effective only in the 
event that the stockholders fail to resolve their differences prior to that 
date; (15) Ordering that the corporation be liquidated and dissolved 
unless either the corporation or one or more of the remaining 
shareholders has purchased all of the shares of another shareholder at 
their fair value by a designated date. 
Olson, Elixir, supra note 2, at 643-45 (footnotes omitted).  Section 302A.751 does 
not explicitly limit remedies to those that operate on the corporation itself, and 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently found authority in section 302A.751 to 
impose on a majority shareholder personal liability for (1) damages relating to 
corporate obligations to pay sales commissions to a terminated shareholder-
employee as well as (2) buyout of the terminated shareholder-employee’s shares.  
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statute goes on to specify the buyout remedy in actions involving 
Minnesota corporations that are not publicly held.148  The court 
may order a buyout upon motion of either the corporation or any 
shareholder, if the court finds a buyout “would be fair and 
equitable to all parties under all of the circumstances of the 
case.”149  The buyout is to be at the “fair value of the shares as of the 
date of the commencement of the action or as of another date 
found equitable by the court.”150  If the shares in question are 
subject to a buy-sell arrangement, the statute specifies that the 
buyout shall be at the price and terms set forth in such 
arrangement “unless the court determines that the price or terms 
are unreasonable under all the circumstances of the case.”151 
Unlike sections 14.30 and 14.34 of the Model Act, therefore, 
section 302A.751 empowers a court to employ a seemingly limitless 
range of equitable remedies when a shareholder has proven one of 
the grounds specified for relief.  Unlike the Model Act provisions, 
section 302A.751 explicitly vests the power to move for the buyout 
remedy in either the corporation or any shareholder, including the 
petitioning shareholder.  Consequently, a buyout is not exclusively a 
shield under the MBCA, it is also a sword in the hands of every 
shareholder.152  Unlike the Model Act provisions, section 302A.751 
explicitly authorizes a court to override an existing buy-sell 
agreement in a buyout remedy based on the court’s second-
guessing of reasonableness rather than any grounds under contract 
law for finding the buy-sell agreement invalid or unenforceable.153  
 
See Billigmeier v. Concorde Mktg., Inc., C4-01-324 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2001) 
discussed infra at notes 214 to 222 and accompanying text. 
 148. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(2) (2000).  “One particular remedy, the buy-out 
of the complaining shareholder, is of such importance that it is spelled out in 
some detail.”  Olson, Elixir, supra note 2, at 645. 
 149. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(2) (2000). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. The exclusively defensive availability of the buyout provision in section 
14.34 was meant to provide a countervailing balance to section 14.30.  Minority 
shareholders with strong oppression claims will tend to be bought out; those with 
weak claims will not.  MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 cmt. 2 (2000) (“These 
provisions are intended to reduce the risk that either the dissolution proceeding 
or the buyout election will be used for strategic purposes.”).  Section 302A.751 
does little or nothing to discourage “strategic” use of the buyout remedy and has 
such vague and confusing grounds for granting a remedy that any terminated 
shareholder-employee has little to lose by taking a parting shot. 
 153. The Official Comment to section 14.34 notes, however, that a court 
should not be bound in fashioning a buyout remedy to the terms of a buy-sell 
agreement if doing so would be “unjust or inequitable in light of the facts and 
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Section 302A.751 also empowers a court to award reasonable 
expenses, including attorneys’ fees and disbursements to any party 
if the other party has acted “arbitrarily, vexatiously or otherwise not 
in good faith.”154  Section 14.34 links fee and expense awards to the 
strength of the petitioning shareholder’s underlying claim of 
oppression.155 
The second major difference between the Model Act 
provisions and section 302A.751, is that section 302A.751 adds a 
new and incredibly vague ground for relief to the standard 
repertory of deadlock, oppression, fraud, illegality and waste.  
Section 302A.751(1)(b)(3) permits the grant of any remedy out of 
the court’s equity arsenal if the shareholder proves “the directors 
or those in control of the corporation have acted in a manner 
unfairly prejudicial toward one or more shareholders in their 
capacities as shareholders or directors of a corporation that is not a 
publicly held corporation, or as officers or employees of a closely 
held corporation.”156  Before the “unfairly prejudicial” language was 
 
circumstances of the particular case.”  MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 cmt 4(b) 
(2000).  The checks-and-balances built into sections 14.30 and 14.34 build in some 
assurance that only those cases involving relatively meritorious claims of 
oppression will proceed to the buyout phase.  See supra note 152.  Only in those 
cases in which the corporation or other shareholders have elected the buyout 
remedy would a buy-sell agreement be subjected to this second-guessing by the 
court.  Again, section 302A.751 offers none of these assurances.  A terminated 
shareholder-employee subject to a buy-sell agreement has little or nothing to lose 
by petitioning the court to second-guess the terms of a buyout. 
 154. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(4) (2000) (“If the court finds that a party to a 
proceeding brought under this section has acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or 
otherwise not in good faith, it may in its discretion award reasonable expenses, 
including attorneys’ fees and disbursements, to any of the other parties.”). 
 155. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34(e) (2000) (“If the court finds that the 
petitioning shareholder had probable grounds for relief under paragraphs (ii) or 
(iv) of section 14.30(2), it may award to the petitioning shareholder reasonable 
fees and expenses of counsel and of any experts employed by him.”).  This 
provision once again helps ensure some balance in use of the buyout remedy.  See 
supra notes 152 & 153.  A petitioning shareholder with a strong oppression claim 
will be met by a buyout response, but will be eligible for a fee and expense award. 
 156. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(1)(b)(3) (2000).  For discussion of the derivation 
of the “unfairly prejudicial” standard by the principal author of the 1983 
amendments that added this language to section 302A.751, see Olson, Elixir, supra 
note 2, at 638-42. 
The legislative intent was to lower the threshold for relief by eliminating 
any need to establish a continuing course of abuse, to define the lower 
threshold by using a term that has not been subjected to narrow judicial 
interpretation, and to allow consideration of the injuries suffered by 
shareholders other than solely as investors. 
Id. at 638. 
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added in 1983, section 302A.751 had authorized equitable relief if 
“the directors or those in control of the corporation have been 
guilty of fraud or mismanagement, or abuse of authority, or of 
persistent unfairness toward minority shareholders.”157  The 
“unfairly prejudicial” standard in section 302A.751 was meant to 
broaden these grounds to permit relief in a wider variety of cases.158  
Among other things, the new standard was intended to negate the 
notion that there had to be anything “persistent” or repeated about 
the unfairness.159  One instance is all it takes. 
Section 302A.751(3)(a), also added in 1983, provides a court 
with even more troubling “guidance” regarding when to order 
relief in claims involving a closely held Minnesota corporation: 
In determining whether to order equitable relief, 
dissolution, or a buy-out, the court shall take into 
consideration the duty which all shareholders in a closely 
held corporation owe one another to act in an honest, fair 
and reasonable manner in the operation of the 
corporation and the reasonable expectations of all 
shareholders as they exist at the inception and develop 
during the course of the shareholders’ relationship with 
the corporation and with each other.160 
According to one of the main proponents of the 1983 
amendments, this language was intended to provide guidance to 
Minnesota courts in applying the “unfairly prejudicial” standard.161  
It should be applied when there has been a “breach of the fiduciary 
duty which shareholders owe to each other in the operation of the 
corporation” (statutory recognition of the fiduciary duty of 
 
 157. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(1)(b)(2) (1982). 
 158. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 (2000) (Reporter’s Notes – 1982-1984). 
This is a more liberal rule than ‘persistently unfair,’ which required 
repeated adverse results before a shareholder could sue.  Now only one 
instance is required.  Moreover, the law now takes into account the 
treatment of the shareholder in ways outside traditional shareholder 
rights, i.e., the right to ownership.  That is, it includes, for example, the 
discharge of a shareholder-employee as a ground, if that discharge was 
‘unfairly prejudicial. 
Id.  See also MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 10.11[b], at 10-25 to 10-26; 
Anthony & Boraas, Betrayed, supra note 2, at 1177-78; Olson, Elixir, supra note 2, at 
638-39; Pentelovich & Gilbertson, supra note 2, at 21. 
 159. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 (2000) (Reporter’s Notes – 1982-1984); see also 
Berreman v. West Publ’g Co., 615 N.W.2d 362, 373-74 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) 
(holding that materiality is not an element of unfairly prejudicial conduct under 
section 302A.751). 
 160. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(3a) (2000). 
 161. See Olson, Minority, supra note 2, at 17. 
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shareholders in a closely held corporation being the intent behind 
the “honest, fair and reasonable” language).162  And, “[i]n addition, 
unfairly prejudicial conduct may be found if a shareholder’s 
reasonable expectations with respect to his relationship to the 
corporation are defeated.”163 
If the “unfairly prejudicial” standard were limited by 
traditional notions of breach of fiduciary duty, it would be 
troubling enough.164  By making defeat of “reasonable 
expectations” an alternative basis for finding an “unfairly 
prejudicial” situation and ordering a buyout, the 1983 amendments 
basically stunted further case law elucidation of the fiduciary duty 
of shareholders for purposes of section 302A.751.165  Why should a 
shareholder seeking relief under section 302A.751 try to prove 
breach of fiduciary duty by those in control when he or she may 
prevail simply by proving that things did not go according to his or 
her reasonable expectations?  The corporate plaintiffs bar went to 
work. 
Disturbing decisions.  Incredibly disturbing “reasonable 
expectations” decisions under section 302A.751 began to 
accumulate: 
• Pedro v. Pedro.  In Pedro v. Pedro,166 three brothers were 
equal one-third shareholders in a family business and had worked 
in the business for many years, all receiving the same benefits and 
compensation.167  In 1987, one of the brothers discovered alleged 
discrepancies in the corporation’s financial records, and his 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. In Berreman v. West Publishing Co., the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
affirmed that conduct insufficient to constitute a breach of fiduciary duty may 
nevertheless be “unfairly prejudicial” within the meaning of section 302A.751.  615 
N.W.2d 362, 374 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. & 
Servs., 527 S.E.2d 371, 387-88 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000)).  For discussion of the 
derivation of the “reasonable expectations” grounds for minority relief in closely 
held corporations, see Thompson, supra note 119, at 211-16. 
 165. In 1995, the Minnesota Court of Appeals narrowed significantly the 
breadth of fiduciary breach claims that could serve as the basis for individual 
actions under section 302A.751.  In Skoglund v. Brady, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals held that a shareholder was required to show individual injury separate 
from the injury to the corporation in order to sustain an individual claim for relief 
under section 302A.751, otherwise the claim was derivative in nature.  541 N.W.2d 
17 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).  See also Wessin v. Archives Corp., 592 N.W.2d 460, 465 
(Minn. 1999) (affirming this aspect of Skoglund); Pentelovich & Gilbertson, supra 
note 2, at 20-21. 
 166. 489 N.W.2d 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
 167. Id. at 799-800. 
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relationship with his brothers disintegrated as he investigated the 
discrepancies against their wishes.168  The brothers eventually 
terminated the investigating brother and bought back his shares 
under an existing buy-sell agreement.169 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s award 
to the disappointed brother-shareholder-employee of damages 
equal to the difference between the fair value of his shares and the 
price at which he had been required to sell them under the buy-sell 
agreement, plus damages for breach of fiduciary duty and for lost 
future wages for lifetime employment, plus attorneys’ fees, 
expenses and prejudgment interest.170  In doing so, the court 
quoted from an article by a leading proponent of section 302A.751, 
stating that “[t]he reasonable expectations of [a shareholder in a 
closely held corporation, in addition to ownership interest,] are a 
job, salary, a significant place in management, and economic 
security for his family.”171 
• Sawyer v. Curt & Company.  In Sawyer v. Curt & Company,172 a 
CEO terminated by the board sued under section 302A.751.  The 
Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the CEO’s “reasonable 
expectations” under section 302A.751 were a continued “job, a 
salary and a significant place in management.”173  Consequently, 
any termination of employment, even if perfectly legal and in 
accordance with contract, defeated her expectations and required 
a buyout without any further proof of “unfairly prejudicial” 
conduct.174  The Sawyer court held: 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 800. 
 170. Id. at 800-01. 
 171. Id. at 802 (quoting Olson, Elixir, supra note 2, at 629).  The leading 
commentators on the MBCA blamed the Pedro court for opening “a Pandora’s 
box” by quoting these sweeping generalities by Professor Olson.  MATHESON & 
GARON, supra note 9, § 10.11[b], at 10-29 to 10-30.  For a contemporary 
excoriation of the Pedro decision and the effect it could have on established at-will 
employment doctrine in Minnesota, see Sandra L. Schlafge, Comment, Pedro v. 
Pedro: Consequences for Closely Held Corporations and the At-Will Doctrine in Minnesota, 
76 MINN. L. REV. 1071 (1992). 
 172. No. C7-90-2040, C9-90-2041, 1991 WL 65320 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 
1991). 
 173. Id. at *2. 
 174. Id. at *2-3 (“It is undisputed respondent was terminated from her 
employment without any proposal for compensation by appellants.  This one 
incident of unfairly prejudicial conduct is enough to justify the trial court’s grant 
of the motion for a buy-out under [302A.751].”) 
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We believe when those in control of a closely held 
corporation terminate the employment of a moving 
shareholder, a good faith effort must be made to buyout 
the shareholder at a fair price or adjust the income 
distribution mechanism to insure the shareholder an 
equitable investment return.  If this is not done, that is 
sufficient evidence of unfairly prejudicial conduct by the 
dominant corporation members.175 
Read literally, the Sawyer decision turns section 302A.751 into 
an absolute right to a buyout remedy for any shareholder-employee 
of a closely held corporation.  If the terminated shareholder-
employee is not offered a buyout at a value he or she likes, there 
has been “unfairly prejudicial” treatment.  In other words, the 
failure to do what section 302A.751 requires you to do if the 
shareholder-employee were to prove “unfairly prejudicial” conduct 
is, itself, “unfairly prejudicial.”176  The Sawyer case essentially 
removes all meaning from the “unfairly prejudicial” standard and 
reads it out of the statute.177 
 
 175. Id. at *2. 
 176. Id.  An Eighth Circuit panel, in McCallum v. Rosen’s Diversified, Inc., 153 
F.3d 701 (8th  Cir. 1998), followed the Sawyer rule, holding that a CEO who was 
terminated in compliance with law and all agreements and then offered a buyout 
at only a modest premium over current valuation, was by those actions alone 
“unfairly prejudiced.”  In the words of the court: “We simply hold that terminating 
the CEO – as opposed to an employee that did not have a significant role in 
management – and then offering to redeem his stock, which was issued partially to 
lure him to remain at the company, constituted conduct toward McCallum as a 
shareholder sufficient to invoke the requirements of the Minnesota Act.”  Id. at 
704.  But see MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 10.11[b], at 10-32 (“Such a per se 
rule probably was not intended by the legislature.”). 
 177. Sawyer, 1991 WL 65320, at *2.  Creation of an absolute rule of 
shareholder-employee buyout is certainly consistent with what the chief proponent 
of the 1983 amendments to section 302A.751 intended to accomplish with the 
reference to “reasonable expectations.”  According to Professor Olson, the vague 
term was intended to make it clear that a shareholder would always be entitled to a 
buyout if events worked out to his or her disadvantage.  As he put it: “Section 751 
is designed to reduce litigation by removing questions of law as obstacles to relief 
for non-controlling shareholders.  The law is now clear – such shareholders have a 
right to relief from ‘mistreatment’ which exploits their vulnerability and defeats 
their reasonable expectations.”  Olson, Minority, supra note 2, at 11.  The 
quotation marks around “mistreatment” were added by Professor Olson to 
indicate that mistreatment does not really mean mistreatment, or as he explains in 
a note “‘Mistreatment’ is a broad general term which emcompasses [sic] all acts of the 
controlling group which leave the other shareholders at a disadvantage.”  Id. at 11 n.24 
(italics in original text).  See also Olson, Elixir, supra note 2, at 633 (same tongue-in-
cheek use of the word “mistreatment”).  Both of Professor Olson’s articles on the 
1983 amendments are full of words like “mistreatment” and “abuse” in the main 
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• Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc.  In Pooley,178 a minority 
shareholder-employee was convicted of criminal assault and 
criminal damage to property in the scope of his employment and 
was terminated and voted out as an officer and director of the 
corporation.179  The court of appeals affirmed that the shareholder-
employee’s misconduct should have no impact on his reasonable 
expectations under section 302A.751.180  He was “unfairly 
prejudiced” by his termination and should be bought out with no 
equitable reduction in fair value resulting from his criminal 
behavior.181 
Read together, these cases portray a chaotic, topsy-turvy world 
in which an employee owning shares in a Minnesota closely held 
corporation may be found to have an absolute right to lifetime 
employment or a buyout of their shares at a price deemed fair and 
reasonable by a court notwithstanding whatever buy-sell or 
employment arrangements they may have agreed to before disputes 
arose, notwithstanding an absence of truly oppressive conduct by 
majority shareholders and notwithstanding whatever egregious 
conduct on the part of the employee has led to his or her 
termination of employment.  Fundamental principles of contract 
and employment law, rules that many would consider part of the 
basic glue that holds a predictable commercial world together, are 
subverted by section 302A.751 in favor of an unpredictable ad hoc 
regime administered by Minnesota courts.182 
 
body of the text.  Only by reading the footnotes does one understand what he was 
attempting to accomplish.  It is no wonder that section 302A.751 is the vague and 
ambiguous nightmare that it is today.  It is certainly far from clear that the 
Minnesota Legislature understood his idiosyncratic semantics when it adopted the 
1983 amendments.  See also MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 10.11[b], at 10-32 
(“Such a per se rule probably was not intended by the legislature.”). 
 178. 513 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). 
 179. Id. at 836. 
 180. Id. at 838. 
 181. Id. 
 182. According to Professor Olson, principal draftsman of the 1983 
amendments that injected most of the chaos into section 302A.751, this was the 
intent of the Minnesota Legislature: “The broad scope of [s]ection 751 reflects the 
Legislature’s trust in the ability of the judiciary to achieve equitable results on the 
facts appearing in individual cases.”  Olson, Minority, supra note 2, at 11.  Assuming 
that was truly the understanding and intent of the legislature, the body of case law 
resulting from the 1983 amendments indicates that the legislature’s trust was 
misplaced.  The principal commentators on the MBCA are charitable and 
understated in their assessment: “The cases decided under [s]ection 302A.751 
demonstrate the difficulty of establishing a doctrine under the ‘unfairly 
prejudicial’ and ‘reasonable expectations’ standards that is both sufficiently 
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1994 amendments: too little, too late?  In part as a reaction to 
cases like Pedro, Sawyer and Pooley, the Minnesota Legislature made 
several amendments to section 302A.751 in 1994 intended to re-
insert some balance and predictability into the chaos.183  Among 
other things, the 1994 amendments added the word “all” into the 
phrase “reasonable expectations of all shareholders” in section 
302A.751(3a) to emphasize that it is not just the “reasonable 
expectations” of the shareholder seeking the buyout that should be 
considered.184  So, a judge is supposed to take into consideration 
the fact that other shareholders who have signed the same buy-sell 
or employment agreement as the petitioning shareholder may have 
a reasonable expectation that the terms of the agreement would be 
respected or that a shareholder-employee convicted of criminal 
activity in the course of employment could be terminated without 
causing further damage to the corporation through an expensive 
buyout.  This was a subtle fix at best.185 
The 1994 amendments also added a presumption in favor of 
written agreements to the end of section 302A.751(3a): “For 
purposes of this section, any written agreements, including 
employment agreements and buy-sell agreements, between or 
among shareholders or between or among one or more 
shareholders and the corporation are presumed to reflect the 
parties’ reasonable expectations concerning matters dealt with in 
the agreements.”186  Consequently, it may now be somewhat more 
likely that shareholders will actually get what they bargained for in 
written agreements, but no guarantee exists.187  One cannot be 
 
flexible and sufficiently predictable.”  MATHESON & GARON, supra note 9, § 
10.11[b], at 10-31 to 10-32. 
 183. 1994 Minn. Laws ch. 417, §§ 9-11. 
 184. Id. § 11.  See also Anthony & Boraas, Betrayed, supra note 2, at 1179 (“The 
reasonable expectations of both majority and minority shareholders should now 
be examined by the court when determining whether to order equitable relief, 
dissolution or a buy-out.”). 
 185. However, it may have had some salubrious effect on subsequent case law.  
See Advanced Communication Design, Inc. v. Follett, 615 N.W.2d 285, 292-93 
(Minn. 2000) (holding that fair value for purposes of section 302A.751 must be 
determined based on fairness and equity to all shareholders, including 
consideration of oppressive behavior by, and burden on, all shareholders).  See also 
Pentelovich & Gilbertson, supra note 2, at 23 (“Later decisions such as Follett, 
emphasizing that the value should be fair and equitable to all the parties, may 
prevent cases similar to Pooley in the future.”). 
 186. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(3a) (2000). 
 187. The plaintiffs bar has advertised that an arms-length negotiation 
requirement should be read into the presumption, although no such requirement 
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assured through even the most carefully drafted agreements that 
the presumption will hold.  What we needed was a clear opt-out 
provision.  Instead, we got a wishy-washy presumption.188 
Continuing Problems.  Three very recent decisions, while 
indicating a greater deference for written agreements, also 
illustrate the continuing problems caused by section 302A.751: 
• Drewitz v. Walser.  In Drewitz,189 the general manager of a 
BMW dealership negotiated an employment contract and buy-sell  
agreement with his employer over a two-year period (he was 
represented by counsel throughout the process).190  The 
employment contract was for a fixed-term with a right of earlier 
termination for cause (as defined in the contract).191  The buy-sell 
agreement contained a buy-back right at book value upon any 
termination of the general manager’s employment.192  After 
termination, Drewitz brought a claim under section 302A.751 
seeking a buyout at fair value instead of book value based on 
allegations of “unfairly prejudicial” treatment.193  The trial court 
dismissed his claims, reasoning in essence that his reasonable 
expectations were bounded by the terms of his employment 
 
appears in the statutory text.  See Anthony & Boraas, Betrayed, supra note 2, at 1179-
80 (“A shareholder may rebut the presumption that his or her reasonable 
expectations are set forth in an agreement by demonstrating that the provision 
regarding ‘expectations’ is ambiguous, being read out of context or not the 
product of an arms-length negotiation.”).  More recent cases may indicate that 
Minnesota courts have adopted even more stringent requirements for the 
presumption to hold.  See infra notes 189 to 222 and accompanying text. 
 188. See Berreman v. West Publ’g Co., 615 N.W.2d 362, 374 (affirming that the 
presumption in favor of written agreements may be rebutted based on 
consideration of all the circumstances).  Even the most ardent supporters of the 
“reasonable expectations” school of minority relief have pointed out the dangers 
inherent if there is insufficient deference to private ordering in a system of 
corporate law: 
A judicial role would not be attractive also if the parties by private 
contracting could better resolve the dispute or if the possibility of later 
judicial interference itself created uncertainties that increased the overall 
costs of participating in a closely held enterprise.  On the latter point, for 
example, a potential majority shareholder investor (or a creditor) might 
be reluctant to commit funds to an entity, or may seek a greater return 
for doing so, because of a fear that the court would too easily force a 
corporation to redeem a minority investment. 
Thompson, supra note 119, at 224. 
 189. No. C3-00-1759, 2001 WL 436223 (Minn. Ct. App. May 1, 2001) 
 190. Id. at *1. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at *2. 
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contract and buy-sell agreement.194  The court of appeals affirmed, 
citing the 1994 presumption language and pointing to the broad 
integration clauses contained in both the employment contract and 
buy-sell agreement (providing that these agreements “embody the 
entire agreement and understanding among the parties relative to 
the subject matter hereof and supersede all prior oral or written 
agreements and understanding and shall be amended or modified 
only by written instruments signed by all parties hereto”).195 
The Drewitz case is an encouraging development, but it leaves 
many unanswered questions.  How important was it that Drewitz 
negotiated the terms of these agreements at length (as opposed to 
signing a form agreement of his employer)?196  How important was 
it that he was represented by counsel?  Are good integration clauses 
going to be the key in the future?197 
• Gunderson v. Alliance of Computer Professionals, Inc.  
Gunderson joined Alliance of Computer Professionals, Inc. 
(“ACP”) in 1994 shortly after it was founded.198  He had 
responsibility for administrative and financial affairs.199  He had no 
written employment contract.200  In 1997, all shareholders signed a 
 
 194. Id. at *4. 
 195. Id. at *2-4. 
 196. See supra note 187. 
 197. Including a reference to section 302A.751 in the integration clauses of 
employment and buy-sell agreements used by Minnesota closely held corporations 
may be advisable.  Such a clause could read as follows: 
Entire Agreement; modification, amendment and waiver.  This 
agreement constitutes the entire agreement and understanding of the 
parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and supercedes all prior 
written or oral negotiations, agreements and understandings with respect 
thereto.  The terms and conditions of this agreement embody the full 
extent of the parties’ reasonable expectations regarding the [buyout of 
shares of the Company’s stock from Shareholder][employment of 
Employee by the Company] for purposes of section 302A.751 of the 
Minnesota Statutes or otherwise.  In particular, and without limitation on 
the foregoing, the parties represent and agree that [the Buy-Out Price 
specified herein is reasonable and the result of arm’s length negotiation 
between the parties][any investment in the Company by Employee shall 
not create a reasonable expectation of continued employment][add 
further specific representations and agreements] for purposes of section 
302A.751 of the Minnesota Statutes or otherwise.  This agreement may 
not be modified or amended except in writing signed by both parties 
hereto.  No rights hereunder may be waived except in writing signed by 
the party whose right is being so waived. 
 198. 628 N.W.2d 173, 179 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 182. 
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buy-sell agreement that Gunderson had been primarily responsible 
for drafting (including selection of the lawyer who provided him 
with assistance).201  The buy-sell agreement had a provision 
designed by Gunderson for involuntary withdrawal of any 
shareholder by a 75% vote of all outstanding shares with a formula 
purchase price based in part on length of time the shareholder had 
been at ACP.202  In 1998, Gunderson was terminated amid 
allegations of dishonesty, incompetence and spending too much 
time on his own outside business.203  The board offered him $2,300 
for his shares (based on the buy-sell purchase price).204  Gunderson 
claimed the fair value of his shares was $1,133,000.205  Gunderson 
brought claims for breach of employment contract and for a 
buyout at fair value under section 302A.751.  The trial court 
dismissed both claims on summary judgment.206  Gunderson 
appealed. 
With respect to the employment claim, the court of appeals 
affirmed, reasoning that Gunderson was an employee at will and 
certain vague statements by management (he “would always be 
taken care of” and “stick with me and I will make you rich when we 
sell the company”) did not constitute an employment agreement.207  
With respect to the section 302A.751 claim, the court of appeals 
agreed, citing the 1994 presumption, that buying Gunderson out 
under the buy-sell agreement was not unfairly prejudicial to him as 
a shareholder.208  However, the court of appeals remanded the 
 
 201. Id. at 179-80. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 180. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 180-81. 
 207. Id. at 182-84. 
 208. Id. at 186.  The court’s reasoning in deciding that the buy-sell agreement 
did embody the reasonable expectations of the parties indicates that the 
presumption in section 302A.751(3a) may have a high threshold if it is going to be 
relied upon for summary disposition of a case: 
The written agreement in this case specifically provided for the 
involuntary removal of shareholders with or without cause.  It also set 
forth a method for valuing a departing shareholder’s stock, which 
Gunderson proposed to ‘protect ACP if a partner [left] in a more or less 
hostile manner.’  The agreement was an arm’s-length transaction.  
Gunderson spearheaded it and actively participated in drafting it.  In 
fact, he proposed the very provision that authorized his involuntary 
removal, and urged the board to adopt it.  He also selected the attorney 
who assisted the corporation in drafting the agreement.  Given 
Gunderson’s immediate and significant involvement in the preparation 
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302A.751 claim to the trial court for further findings of fact as to 
whether, despite Gunderson’s employment at will, his termination 
might have been “unfairly prejudicial” to him as an employee.209  In 
the words of the court of appeals: 
[E]ven though Gunderson was an at-will employee and, 
therefore, not wrongfully discharged in the breach-of-
contract or tort sense, his employment termination 
triggers a separate inquiry into whether ACP unfairly 
prejudiced Gunderson in his capacity as a shareholder-
employee.  The doctrine of employment-based 
shareholder oppression is distinct from the wrongful-
termination doctrine, and the analysis under the separate 
doctrines should attempt to protect close-corporation 
employment and, at the same time, respect the legitimate 
sphere of the at-will rule.210 
The court of appeals indicated that this result could have been 
different if Gunderson had had a written employment contract 
along with a written buy-sell agreement defining his reasonable 
expectations.211  The court of appeals also indicated that 
Gunderson’s reasonable expectations would not have been 
defeated if the trial court found that his termination was indeed 
the result of his misconduct or incompetence.212 
The deference for written agreements exhibited by the court 
of appeals is encouraging in Gunderson.  Again, however, it leaves 
many questions unanswered.  How important was it that 
Gunderson himself drafted the buy-sell agreements and designed 
the purchase price formula?213 
The problem that Gunderson underscores with respect to 
section 302A.751, however, is its incredible power to single-
handedly undermine entire bodies of law.  For purposes of contract 
law and employment law, Gunderson was an employee at will and 
 
of the agreement, no rational factfinder could conclude that the 
agreement did not reflect his reasonable expectations as a shareholder. 
Id. 
 209. Id. at 193. 
 210. Id. at 190.  The court of appeals cited in this regard Schmedemann, supra 
note 2, at 1439-46. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 191. 
 213. See supra note 208.  See also Pentelovich & Gilbertson, supra note 2, at 21 
(“The Gunderson decision demonstrates that at the very least plaintiffs who actively 
participate in preparing an agreement will have a difficult time convincing a court 
that it does not reflect the parties’ reasonable expectations.”). 
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entitled to no remedy.  Termination of his employment, however, 
could still entitle him to a section 302A.751 buyout.  So, the 
Gunderson court is outlining the rules of a new body of meta-
employment and meta-contract law applicable to determine 
whether a remedy is still available under section 302A.751. 
• Billigmeier v. Concorde Marketing, Inc.  In Billigmeier,214 the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals demonstrated a frightening new 
potential in the reach of section 302A.751 by using that provision as 
authority to impose liability for corporate obligations personally on a 
majority shareholder without any inquiry into traditional notions of 
piercing the corporate veil, fraudulent conveyance or other similar 
doctrine.215  In that case, the plaintiff owned one third of the stock 
of Concorde Marketing and served as an officer, director and sales 
representative.216  Following disputes over commission amounts due 
to plaintiff, the plaintiff was terminated.217  The plaintiff brought 
suit under section 302A.751 for buyout of his shares and for 
commission payments he claimed to be owing by Concord 
Marketing.  The trial court found that Concorde Marketing owed 
the plaintiff nearly $281,000 plus statutory interest for unpaid 
commissions and frustration of reasonable expectations of 
continued employment and also ordered a buyout of his shares for 
$93,312 plus statutory interest.218  Finding that Concorde Marketing 
was unable to pay such amounts and that the majority shareholder 
owed the company approximately $95,000 for advances, the trial 
court ordered the majority shareholder to pay such amounts out of 
his personal assets.219  The trial court reasoned that imposition of 
personal liability was permitted under section 302A.751 because 
the majority shareholder’s termination of plaintiff and intentional 
nonpayment of disputed commission amounts constituted “unfairly 
prejudicial” treatment.220  The trial court also found that valuation 
of Concorde Marketing for purposes of determining the buyout 
price should be as of the date of termination (not the date of 
judgment) and should not take into account the amounts the court 
found that Concorde Marketing then owed to the plaintiff as 
 
 214. No. C4-01-324, 2001 WL 1530356 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2001). 
 215. Id. at *5-6. 
 216. Id. at *1. 
 217. Id. at *2. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at *4-6. 
 220. Id. at *6. 
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commissions!221  On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s finding of facts and its frightening imposition of personal 
liability on the majority shareholder.222 
What should be done?  When the Minnesota Legislature 
adopted the 1983 amendments to section 302A.751, they were 
apparently concerned about enhancing protections against 
oppression of minority shareholders.  I cannot imagine that they 
realized they were unleashing a provision that (1) would subvert 
basic principles of corporate, contract and employment law in 
closely held Minnesota corporations, (2) would be interpreted by at 
least some courts as establishing an automatic or per se rule of 
shareholder-employee buyout regardless of the behavior of those in 
control or those seeking the buyout and (3) would serve as a basis 
for imposition of personal liability on majority shareholders without 
regard to traditional grounds for ignoring limited liability.  I also 
cannot imagine that they realized they were putting in place a 
provision that would produce more litigation and more court 
decisions than any other provision in the MBCA. 
Few entrepreneurs who really understood the troubling 
surprises and unexpected corporate (and, possibly, personal) 
liabilities awaiting them under section 302A.751 would want to 
incorporate in Minnesota.  And if they did, they would never want 
to issue stock to employees. 
Section 302A.751 is intended to help protect those who form 
closely held corporations in Minnesota without benefit of 
competent counsel and adequate advance planning.223  Those who 
 
 221. Id. at *6-7. 
 222. Citing the Pedro decision, the court of appeals made the case sound like 
business as usual under section 302A.751: 
In sum, the district court found that Billigmeier’s employment was 
terminated when he had a reasonable expectation of continued 
employment, that appellants intentionally withheld commissions owed to 
Billigmeier, and that Willing withdrew money from Concorde Marketing 
to fund his independent venture, Concorde Group.  Those findings, 
taken together, are sufficient to support the finding that appellants acted 
in a manner unfairly prejudicial to Billigmeier . . . This court has 
indicated that imposing personal liability is a permissibile form of 
equitable relief under Minn. Stat. § 302A.751 [citing the broad remedial 
language of the statute].  Moreover, imposing personal liability is 
consistent with the broad statutory language of Minn. Stat. § 
302A.751 . . . . 
Id. at *6 (citations omitted). 
 223. See, e.g., Olson, Minority, supra note 2, at 12. 
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do use competent counsel and engage in advance planning224 
should be able to opt out of section 302A.751’s special provisions in 
the articles of incorporation and be governed by an ordinary 
involuntary dissolution statute that does not interfere with basic 
principles of corporate, contract and employment law.  Even after 
the 1994 amendments, the ability to “opt out” through written 
agreements is far too uncertain and too costly. 
Better yet, Minnesota should write this experiment off 
completely and start over with the approach taken in the Model 
Act. 
III.  CONCLUSION: THE MINNESOTA CORPORATE BAR                
SHOULD TAKE CHARGE 
I taught law school at a state university outside of Minnesota 
for eleven years.  During that time I had the privilege of being a 
member of an advisory committee serving the secretary of state of 
my adopted state.225  This committee, made up of prominent 
corporate lawyers, law professors from the two law schools in the 
state and representatives of the secretary of state’s office, advises 
the secretary of state and the legislature regarding reform 
initiatives in the areas of business associations, securities and 
commercial law.226  The committee’s first major undertaking in 
1987 (before I joined it) had been to repair the state’s business 
corporation act which had become desperately out of date.  After 
extensive study, the committee concluded that they should 
recommend adoption of the Model Act as it then existed in 
 
 224. Professor Olson indicates that a “fringe benefit” of the equitable remedy 
provided by section 302A.751 may be to reduce the risk of malpractice liability for 
lawyers who launch clients into closely held Minnesota corporations without 
adequate planning in the form of buy-sell agreements and other contractual 
mechanisms!  Id. at 12 n.25.  This observation indicates an unbelievable naïveté.  
Section 302A.751 makes Minnesota a no-win jurisdiction for lawyers counseling 
entrepreneurs at the time of formation of a closely held corporation.  No amount 
of planning will guarantee that buy-sell agreements and other contractual 
mechanisms will be respected.  I am sure that the last thing the lawyer who advised 
a group of entrepreneurs at formation feels, when a minority shareholder hits the 
jackpot under section 302A.751, is relief at the existence of section 302A.751.  He 
or she is going to be far more concerned with malpractice liability to the majority 
shareholders for incorporating them in Minnesota in the first place without 
adequately advising them of the uncertainties and potential liabilities that are 
unavoidable under the MBCA. 
 225. See Bryn R. Vaaler, Revised Article 8 of the Mississippi UCC: Dealing Directly 
with Indirect Holding, 66 MISS. L.J. 249, 250 n.1 (1996). 
 226. Id. 
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essentially verbatim form and should strive to stay in that 
mainstream by promptly considering and acting upon future 
amendments to the Model Act.227  Their reasoning was that a state 
that was not in the commercial forefront and that already faced 
many problems in attracting businesses and encouraging economic 
development should at least have a corporate statute that was up-to-
date and that would have the benefit of ongoing maintenance and 
improvement by the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws.228 
An additional advantage of adopting the Model Act is that it 
comes complete with a substantial body of precedent and 
commentary.  The Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, 
currently in its third edition, contains not only the extensive official 
commentary for each Model Act section (which is maintained and 
updated by the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws) but also 
contains annotations of hundreds of relevant cases from Model Act 
states in which courts have interpreted the various Model Act-
derived provisions.229  The Model Act is also studied in basically 
every law school in the country and has been extensively analyzed 
in law review and professional commentary.230 
In my years on the secretary of state’s committee, we acted 
diligently on every amendment made to the Model Act.231  We did 
 
 227. E-mail from Daniel G. Hise, to Bryn R. Vaaler (Dec. 31, 2001) (on file 
with author).  Mr. Hise, a practicing corporate lawyer in Jackson, Mississippi, has 
been a member of the Mississippi Secretary of State’s Business Law Advisory Group 
since its inception and has served as chairman of the group.  See also Robert W. 
Hamilton, The Background of the New Mississippi Business Corporation Act, 12 MISS. C. 
L. REV. 161, 162 (1991). 
 228. E-mail from Daniel G. Hise, supra note 227; see also Hamilton, supra note 
227, at 177-78. 
 229. The Model Business Corporation Act Annotated also contains historical 
background discussion of each section and statutory comparisons with provisions 
in various states.  See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. passim. 
 230.  
As of January 2000, it is cited 1026 times as the source of or authority for 
current state statutes.  It has been cited 453 times in state court opinions 
(most often in Delaware), four times by the United States Supreme 
Court, 53 times by the various United States Courts of Appeal (most 
often by the Seventh Circuit), and 88 times by various United States 
District Courts, Bankruptcy Courts, and the Tax Court.  The Official 
Commentary has been cited in 38 cases, and the Act itself has been cited 
or discussed in 614 law review articles not including those appearing in 
ABA journals. 
Richard A. Booth, A Chronology of the Evolution of the MBCA, 56 BUS. LAW. 63, 63 
(2000). 
 231. See James L. Robertson, The Law of Corporate Governance: Coming of Age in 
Mississippi, 65 MISS. L.J. 477, 478 n.7 (1996) (noting annual updating efforts to 
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not make every change made to the Model Act, but we considered 
them all promptly and had what we thought were good reasons for 
not making some of the changes.232  We had a very strong policy of 
making the Model Act changes in order to keep our statute close to 
the Model Act and within the mainstream of corporate statutory 
law. 
The secretary of state’s office did a remarkable job of 
promoting our recommendations at the Legislature.233  In my years 
on the committee, nearly every piece of legislation we 
recommended was approved in essentially the form submitted by 
our legislative sponsors.234  We had great credibility among 
legislators.  Rarely did interest groups oppose our bills.235  On those 
few occasions when they did, a benign compromise was quickly 
reached.236 
If other states can adopt and maintain a corporate statute that 
embodies the best in current corporate statutory thinking through 
diligent work, trust and cooperation among the secretary of state’s 
office, prominent members of the corporate bar, legal academics 
and the legislature, why not Minnesota? 
I do not know the answer.  But I have my suspicions.  I believe 
the problem lies with the Minnesota corporate bar.  The Minnesota 
corporate bar has permitted corporate plaintiffs attorneys and law 
professors too great a role in dictating Minnesota business 
association law.237  Front-line Minnesota corporate practitioners 
 
maintain conformity to Model Act).  For an account of one example of our 
updating efforts, see Bryn R. Vaaler, Major Revisions, supra note 64, at 28. 
 232. For discussion of a Model Act change that we did not make, see Vaaler, 
supra note 64, at 30 (discussing why we did not adopt section 6.21 of the Model 
Act). 
 233. E-mail from Daniel G. Hise, supra note 227. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Where was the Minnesota corporate bar when the 1983 amendments were 
made to section 302A.751?  The law professor who was the primary author of the 
amendments indicates that the corporate bar was asleep at the switch: 
Although both the Chairman of the Advisory Task Force and the 
Chairman of the Section on Corporate, Business, and Banking Law of the 
bar association were notified of the pendency of the 1983 Amendments, 
neither group opposed them prior to passage.  The Task Force Chairman 
made a number of suggestions, most notably that which led to the 
inclusion of the ‘35 shareholder’ criteria for ‘close corporation.’  After 
the 1983 Amendments had become law, the Executive Council of the 
Corporate, Business, and Banking Law Section, rejecting a compromise, 
proposed a bill to completely repeal the minority shareholder protective 
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ought to take back our corporate statute.  They ought to go to the 
Secretary of State and to the Minnesota Legislature and convince 
them that Minnesota has become a legal wasteland in the area of 
corporate statutory law and that radical action is required to bring 
it back in the mainstream. 
This job should not be left to law professors.  It must not be 
thwarted by those who profit from the chaotic uncertainties of 
section 302A.751.  The Minnesota corporate lawyers who really 
have a stake in the quality of the legal environment in which 
Minnesota entrepreneurs operate must take charge. 
The problem may be that knowledgeable Minnesota corporate 
lawyers simply do not think it is worth the time and effort to 
provide Minnesota with a corporate statute that is a reasonable 
alternative to Delaware incorporation.  They may simply find it 
easier to incorporate their clients in Delaware.238  I think that is a 
shame.  Minnesota deserves better. 
 
 
provisions of the 1983 Amendments.  At its legislative meeting on 
February 25, 1984, the House of Delegates of the Minnesota State Bar 
Association rejected the call for repeal. . . . The repeal bill was never 
presented to the legislature. 
Olson, Elixir, supra note 2, at 635 n.54. 
 238. See Loewenstein, supra note 75, at 504-05 (ease of incorporating clients in 
Delaware takes away much of the incentive among corporate lawyers in other 
states to promote local law reform). 
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